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ABSTRACT 
 
 
It is estimated that the yearly cost of containing and responding to conflict worldwide is 
nearly US$10 trillion. Meanwhile, the level of global peace and security is on the steady 
decline and gross violations of human rights and massive loss of human life are not yet an 
issue of the past. As such, contemporary international legal doctrines like The 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) have emerged in an effort to prevent and react to global 
conflict. This thesis performs an atypical study of R2P by performing a rhetorical 
analysis of the doctrine through the lens of Orientalism and post-colonial theory. In doing 
so, this thesis reveals the ways in which the discourse of R2P functions as a mode of 
reproducing and exercising power over the ‘Other’ of international law, the Orient. It also 
shows that the rhetorical persuasiveness of the R2P narrative is itself an Orientalist 
discourse that recreates and reinforces colonial binaries between the Occident and the 
Orient, making the Orient susceptible and subject to contemporary forms of control and 
domination in the name of humanitarianism. By confronting the continuing implications 
of colonial history on contemporary international law, this thesis has recognized and 
deconstructed through rational analysis the lasting psychological and legal effects of the 
colonial enterprise into the twenty-first century.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 1 
     A. Context: An Overview of Conflict and Reaction ...................................................... 1 
     B. Context: The Author Vis-à-vis the Topic .................................................................. 5 
     C. Context: Scope of Research and Thesis Map ............................................................ 7 
I. Post-Colonialism, Discourse and Law............................................................................. 9 
     A. The Post-Colonial in Space and Time....................................................................... 9 
     B. Foucault: Discourse as Power ................................................................................. 10 
     C.  Said: Orientalism as Colonial Discourse ................................................................ 11 
     D. Theoretical Intersections: Post-Colonialism, Orientalism, Law & Rhetoric .......... 13 
     E. Post-Colonialism, Orientalism and Law: A Literature Review............................... 15 
           E.1 Ambivalence As a Technology of Power ........................................................ 15 
           E.2 Interdisciplinary Approaches........................................................................... 17 
           E.3 The Appeals of the Other ................................................................................ 20 
II. R2P: Language and Rhetoric........................................................................................ 22 
     A.  R2P Background .................................................................................................... 22 
           A.1 R2P Documents Considered ........................................................................... 23 
           A.2 From ‘Humanitarian Intervention’ to ‘The Responsibility to Protect’ ........... 24 
     B. Shifting the Terms of the Debate ............................................................................ 25 
     C. New and Improved Vocabularies ............................................................................ 26 
     D.  The Many Faces of ‘Humanitarian’ ....................................................................... 28 
     E. Deconstructing The ‘Responsibility’ to ‘Protect’.................................................... 30 
           E.1 Responsibility .................................................................................................. 31 
           E.2. Protect ............................................................................................................. 34 
III. Beyond Rhetoric – Recharacterizing Sovereignty ...................................................... 36 
     A. Sovereignty: From Control to Responsibility ......................................................... 37 
     B. Displacing History and Sovereignty in UN Documents ......................................... 39 
           B.1 Dismissing Westphalian Sovereignty.............................................................. 39 
            B.2 Establishing Collective Sovereignty .............................................................. 41 
     C. The Logical Fallacy of ‘Responsibility’ .................................................................. 42 
IV. The Oriental Other ...................................................................................................... 45 
     A. International Law’s ‘Self’ and its ‘Other’ ............................................................... 45 
     B.  The Orientalist Mechanism .................................................................................... 48 
 vii 
     C. The Orientalist Process: “The White Man’s Burden” = “The Responsibility to  
Protect” ............................................................................................................................. 49 
     D. The Orientalist Authority ........................................................................................ 52 
     E. The Orientalist Effect: Ambiguity, Ambivalence and Power ................................. 54 
     F. Normalizing Orientalism ......................................................................................... 56 
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 58 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 
Law is Discourse.  Discourse is Rhetoric. Therefore, Law is 
Rhetoric. 
 A Rhetorical Analysis of the Responsibility to Protect.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
A. Context: An Overview of Conflict and Reaction 
  
Almost every country on the planet is currently involved in some form of armed 
violence, either on its own territory or abroad.1 Only 11 countries are considered conflict-
free at the moment, but nearly all of them are conflict prone.2 With levels of international 
peace and security on the steady decline, 500 million people are living in countries that 
are currently at risk of instability and conflict.3 Accordingly, the cost of containing and 
responding to the consequences of violence is nearly US$10 trillion per year. 4 
Categorically, the most common type of violent conflict is internal conflict, particularly 
civil war.5  More than 800 people died during the 18-day Egyptian revolution of 25 
January 2011.6  Up to 50,000 people were killed during the uprisings in Libya in 2012,7 
and the death toll from the civil war in Syria has exceeded 191,000 individuals to date.8 
These figures are not simply staggering numbers; they represent the loss of human lives, 
the loss of boys and girls, sisters and brothers, mothers and fathers. These numbers 
represent shattered lives, devastated futures and tarnished histories. Nonetheless, conflicts 
 
1 INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMICS & PEACE, GLOBAL PEACE INDEX 2014; MEASURING PEACE AND ASSESSING 
COUNTRY RISK 3 (2014), 
http://www.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/2014%20Global%20Peace%20Index%20REPORT.pdf  
2 Id.  
3 Id. 
4 Id, at 2. 
5 WILLIAM J. LAHNEMAN, MILITARY INTERVENTION: CASES IN CONTEXT FOR THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY xiii (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2004). 
6 Lateef Mungin, Amnesty: Egypt far from justice over unrest that killed more than 800, CNN, (May 19, 
2011), available at http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/05/19/egypt.revolution.report/.  
7 Seumad Milne, If the Libyan war was about saving lives, it was a catastrophic failure, THE GUARDIAN, 
(October 26, 2011), available at http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/oct/26/libya-war-
saving-lives-catastrophic-failure.  
8 JOHN Heilprin, UN: Death toll from Syrian civil war tops 191,000, ASSOCIATED PRESS, (August 22, 
2014), available at http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/08/22/united-nations-syria-death-
toll/14429549/.  
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of their nature continue to rise and fall with trillions of dollars being channeled toward 
containing their consequences.9  If human rights are indeed inviolable, it is reasonable to 
conclude that ‘somebody must do something’ to put an end once and for all to the 
circumstances that continue to have such horrific consequences on human life. Humanity 
simply cannot afford more Syrias and Libyas. Indeed these suggestions are not original, 
nor are the situations that have tarnished human history with gross violations of human 
rights and the consequent loss of human life. As such, in 1999, former Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan asked the United Nations (UN) General Assembly, “if humanitarian 
intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to 
Rwanda, to Srebrenica—to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend 
every precept of our common humanity?”10  
By the 1990s, individual states or coalitions of states increasingly resorted to 
‘humanitarian intervention’: intervention in the internal affairs of other nations in the 
name of conflict resolution. A single legal definition of humanitarian intervention does 
not exist, but mainstream international politics and law generally regard it as the right of 
one state to exercise coercive control or action in the territory of another state where the 
laws of humanity are being violated.11   As demonstrated below, intervention usually 
involves the use of armed force and the broad consensus is that it should only be 
exercised with exceptional UN Security Council authorization strictly “for the purpose of 
preventing or putting to a halt gross and massive violations of human rights or 
international humanitarian law.”12  Within less than a decade, many world leaders and 
members of civil societies around the world began to question the legitimacy, integrity 
and intentions of so-called ‘humanitarian intervention,’ criticizing it as a means to evade 
state sovereignty or as an excuse for powerful states to realize their economic and 
political objectives in the decolonized world. Others were more concerned with the 
international legality of coercive intervention and whether it was possible to establish 
 
9 supra note 1, at 2. 
10 ICISS, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT VII (2001), available at 
http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf [hereinafter ICISS]; Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
asked this question first at the 1999 United Nations General Assembly, and again in his Millennium report 
to the General Assembly in 2000.  
11 ANNE RYNIKER, THE ICRC’S POSITION ON “HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION” 528 (June 
2001), https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/527-532_ryniker-ang.pdf. 
12 Id. 
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standardized rules of engagement or a reliable international precedent on which to base 
future interventions.13  
  Initially, humanitarian interventions took the form of diplomatic or economic 
mediation, but more and more frequently interventions have become military in nature 
with the alleged goal of ending hostilities.14 Contemporary interventions share a common 
feature in both their proclaimed purpose and their pretext: obligation and responsibility. 
For example, intervention was said to be necessary, an obligation, of the UN and later of 
the United States, in Somalia in the early 1990s. NATO was commissioned to create a 
secure environment that would allow for the smooth roll out of humanitarian operations 
due to a hunger epidemic clutching the nation and a growing and dangerous state of 
lawlessness that put the lives of hundreds of thousands of civilians at risk.15 However, in 
the absence of established rules of engagement or a clear plan of action, the US and 
NATO forces with their poor understanding of Somali politics and historical grievances 
failed to address the underlying sources of conflict. 16  As a result, they became involved 
in violent clashes with militias on the ground, which quickly led the forces to withdraw in 
1994, leaving Somalia to be engulfed by a violent civil war that has continued to this 
day.17  Soon after, a gruesome civil war raged on in Rwanda; as the Hutu majority 
terrorized the Tutsi minority, the world stood idly by. Public criticism of humanitarian 
intervention mounted as the Somalia intervention was condemned as a failure and as a 
waste of Western resources. Possibly in an effort to divert attention from the political 
blowout that followed the Somalia fiasco, the UN Security Council finally authorized a 
peacekeeping mission for Rwanda, a conflict it showed little concern toward beforehand. 
18  Too little, too late, an ill-prepared, ill-equipped UN peacekeeping force landed in 
 
13 Jon Western and Joshua S. Goldstein, Humanitarian Intervention Comes of Age, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 
(November/December 2011), available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136502/jon-western-and-
joshua-s-goldstein/humanitarian-intervention-comes-of-age.  
14 supra note 5, at xiii; ‘Humanitarian Intervention’ was formerly called ‘military intervention,’ but the term 
‘military’ proved to be very contentious and was later replaced with ‘humanitarian,’ a strategic political and 
rhetorical move.  
15 JOHN TERENCE O’NEIL & NICHOLAS REES, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING IN THE 
POST-COLD WAR ERA 107 (Routledge 2006) (2005).  
16 supra note 13. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
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Rwanda in 1993, only to be attacked by Hutu extremists shortly after its arrival. 19 With 
the death of ten Belgian peacekeepers, the forces swiftly withdrew, again leaving “more 
than half a million civilians [to be] killed in a matter of months [;] the international 
community failed to act.”20 In contrast, when the Bosnia War broke out in 1992, NATO 
swiftly intervened, ironically through airstrikes, in order to fulfill its ‘responsibility’ to 
establish peace and to put an end to the ethnic cleansing of the Muslims.21  Keeping with 
the theme of obligation and responsibility, the international community also claimed that 
intervention was necessary to halt human rights abuses in East Timor and then to 
reinstate a democratically elected government in Haiti.22 The United Nations Mission to 
Sierra Leone was established in 1999 to work with the Government and international 
organizations to implement a peace agreement and to assist with disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration.23 And most notably, after war broke out in Kosovo in 
1998, intervention there became one of the most contentious examples in history. NATO 
forces deployed without UN Security Council authorization, constituting a clear violation 
of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter that governs the international use of force.24 Most 
recently, again through NATO, the international community supposedly fulfilled its 
responsibility to intervene in Libya in 2012 in an effort to restore peace between warring 
factions and to rid the country of a violent dictator. 25  Nonetheless, since NATO’s 
withdrawal, Libya has undergone sustained turmoil with increased intrastate conflict, 
terrorism and political division.26  The fate of the Libyan conflict and the impact of 
humanitarian intervention there will be telling in the future. Now, the American-Arab 
airstrikes in Syria have purportedly been deployed to contain the spread of the dangerous 
and radical Islamic State (ISIS and ISIL) throughout Syria, Iraq and the rest of the 
 
19 supra note 13. 
20 supra note 13. 
21 Peace support operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Nov. 2014), available at 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52122.htm.  
22 ICISS, supra note 10, at xiv. 
23 supra note 15, at 183. 
24 supra note 13. 
25 AIDAN HEHIR ET, AL., LIBYA, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND THE FUTURE OF 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION (Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
26 supra note 1. 
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region.27 The notions of obligation and responsibility in the context of coercive military 
intervention are questionable, especially considering that many of these examples of 
intervention failed to achieve their supposed objectives and most of them have actually 
exacerbated the harm and suffering that they apparently set out to contain.  
The turbulent track record of humanitarian intervention together with Secretary 
General Annan’s 1999 General Assembly appeal fuelled the 2001 development of The 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P), an international legal doctrine established by the 
Canadian-led International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). 
The aim of R2P was to establish a legal and moral framework to justify military 
intervention for human protection purposes. Some legal and political theorists regard R2P 
as a breakthrough, a substantial improvement, in the discourse endorsing humanitarian 
intervention and promoting human rights.28 Others view R2P as essentially the same and 
just as controversial as the military humanitarian intervention doctrine,29 making R2P and 
humanitarian intervention two sides of the same coin.   
 
B. Context: The Author Vis-à-vis the Topic 
 
  As a former student of literature, I approach the study of international law from a 
linguistic and literary perspective, seeing international law primarily as a system of 
discourse and rhetoric, which eventually manifests as a system of rights and order in the 
“Occident” and as a system of interests and control in the “Orient.”30 Studying emerging 
legal doctrines like R2P and understanding how the principle of non-intervention and the 
norm of state sovereignty have evolved since the Cold-War era raised for me a series of 
 
27 Nick Paton Walsh & Laura Smith-Spark, Airstrikes target another Islamist group in Syria, CNN 
(November 6, 2014), available at http://edition.cnn.com/2014/11/06/world/meast/syria-
crisis/index.html?hpt=hp_t2.  
28 See GARETH EVANS, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: ENDING MASS ATROCITY 
CRIMES ONCE AND FOR ALL (The Brookings Institution, 2008) (2008).  
See Lee Feinstein and Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Duty to Protect, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, (January/February 
2004), available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59540/lee-feinstein-and-anne-marie-slaughter/a-
duty-to-prevent. 
29 Noam Chomsky, The Responsibility to Protect: Text of Lecture Given at UN General Assembly (Jul. 
2009), available at http://www.chomsky.info/talks/20090723.htm (see author’s note at supra note 14). 
30 Edward Said coined these terms. In this thesis, “Orient” represents the non-western, non-European 
nations, or the ‘Other’ of international law and will be used to represent the subaltern former colonies, 
developing states, the Middle East and parts of Asia. The “Occident” represents the powerful western 
nations, the ‘Self’ of international law and will be used to represent geopolitically powerful states including 
former colonizers, Europe, the United States and its coalition partners. 
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suspicions about the political and legal intentions that fueled their development. These 
suspicions became especially apparent when I found myself implicitly invoking 
intervention in the face of massive human rights abuses and to humanitarian crises in the 
region of my origin, the Middle East. When frantic media headlines announced death 
after death in Egypt in 2011, I was frustrated by the silence of the UN and appealed for 
international condemnation of the Egyptian government. Shortly afterward, when 
frenzied reports announced that women and girls were being raped in Libya and entire 
villages in Benghazi and Misrata had been attacked by government forces because of 
their residents’ political views, I voiced my desire for the international community to ‘do 
something’ to put an end to the injustice. Finally, I have expressed my dismay at 
chemical weapons attacks in Syria, the massive loss of life and the relentless destruction 
of infrastructure, historical sites and agricultural lands. I have also been an advocate for 
international condemnation of the warring parties’ illegal actions and for the facilitation 
of humanitarian aid deliveries inside Syria. The more I engaged with R2P discourse, the 
more I felt suspicious of what I, myself was actually appealing for in Egypt, Libya and 
Syria, but I was unable to properly articulate my conclusions. It is this unexplained 
discomfort that led me to delve further into the relevant international legal discourse to 
unveil the root of my unease. In doing so, I discovered that directly and indirectly 
appealing for intervention invariably translated to suggesting the evasion of state 
sovereignty. While I see sovereignty as the only remaining defense that could potentially 
protect countries in the Middle East and developing nations around the world from 
contemporary Western imperialism, I was caught in a moral paradox between supporting 
human protection on the one hand and regional and state sovereignty on the other hand.  
Post-colonial theory and the study of rhetoric have helped me come to terms with 
my own qualms about the evolving international legal atmosphere and discourses that 
found their way into my own consciousness and vocabulary. In doing so, I found that 
Edward Said’s theory of Orientalism provides a useful and productive framework 
through which to engage in an introspective study of how humanitarian discourse 
functions, and where I, as a hybrid subject of both the Occident and the Orient, fit into 
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this discourse and into my troubling moral paradox.31 Thus, the purpose of this thesis is 
to empower myself to “use [my] mind historically and rationally for the purposes of 
reflective understanding and genuine disclosure.”32  
 
C. Context: Scope of Research and Thesis Map 
 
Through the lens of Orientalism, this thesis examines the discourse of R2P as 
presented primarily in the ICISS report and endeavors to reveal how the Orientalist 
undertones of the R2P narrative function as a mode of reproducing and exercising power 
over the ‘Other’ of international law, the Orient.33 The rhetorical persuasiveness of R2P’s 
humanitarian narrative is itself an Orientalist discourse, which promotes Orientalist 
binaries between lawful and unlawful, responsible and irresponsible, capable and 
incapable, to name a few. The impact of R2P’s implicit Orientalist discourse is that it can 
result in an unintentional ‘self-orientalization’ when people of the Orient invoke 
intervention in the face of gross violations of human rights. At the same time, when 
people of the Occident invoke intervention, they subconsciously reinforce the Orientalist 
discourse, thereby empowering Oriental subordination and subservience to the Occident. 
This reveals one of the most ingenious built-in mechanisms of power exercised through 
R2P, which on the surface appears to be altruistic, humanitarian and desirable to both the 
Orient and the Occident. “Genuine disclosure” of this conundrum is the locus of my 
moral paradox with regards to R2P.34  
This project is important because, as explained by Alpana Roy, “the scholarship 
of critical legal studies has challenged the static monolithic categories constructed by 
liberal positivist law, and in doing so have insisted upon the necessity of recognizing 
partial realities, subjugated knowledges, and subaltern positions.” 35  Furthermore, 
Orientalism provides a helpful framework through which to analyze R2P because, “a 
postcolonial view not only queries the base from which liberal positivist law unthinkingly 
 
31 See HOMI K. BHABHA, THE LOCATION OF CULTURE (Routledge 1994) [hereinafter Bhabha] for more 
information on hybrid theory. 
32 EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM xxiii (Vintage Books 1979) (1978) [hereinafter Orientalism]. 
33 See supra note 19 for definitions of Orient and Occident.  
34 Orientalism, supra note 32. 
35 ALPANA ROY, POSTCOLONIAL THEORY AND LAW: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 320  (2008), 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/AdelLawRw/2008/10.pdf [hereinafter Roy]. 
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functions; it also provides a different forum in which the law’s taxonomic structures and 
ontological foundations may be understood from the Other’s perspective.”36  
Chapter I of this thesis presents post-colonialism as a field of study and outlines 
the theoretical framework provided by post-colonial discourse theory generally, and by 
Edward Said’s Orientalism specifically.  Chapter I also illustrates the intersections 
between post-colonial discourse theory and its application to law and rhetoric and surveys 
insightful examples of post-colonial legal analysis through a literature review that focuses 
primarily on the scholarship of international legal historian Nathaniel Berman and his 
engagements with ambivalence as a form of power, orientalism as a form of discourse 
and other disciplines like art, literature, and media as sources of insight. Chapter II 
introduces the doctrine of R2P as it is presented in the ICISS report and relevant 
supporting UN documents where the doctrine has been endorsed. Chapter II also explains 
how R2P evolved from its predecessor, humanitarian intervention, and takes an in-depth 
look at the language and rhetoric of the doctrine. This rhetorical analysis will examine 
how R2P attempts to recharacterize the concept of state sovereignty and why the logic of 
‘responsibility’ in the context of intervention law is flawed. Chapter III will apply post-
colonial theory and Orientalism to the rhetorical analysis conducted in the previous 
chapter to reveal the mechanisms of power established by the R2P discourse. This 
chapter will also apply Orientalism to R2P to explain how international law is itself 
predicated on a powerful system of othering. Finally, this thesis will be concluded with 
suggestions for future research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36 Id, at 321.  
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I. Post-Colonialism, Discourse and Law 
 
 
A. The Post-Colonial in Space and Time 
 
As the term implies, that which falls under the realm of the post-colonial is that 
which succeeds colonialism. It also implies that colonialism itself was a contained 
enterprise with a start and an end date.37 To view the era of colonialism with its power, 
domination and history as finite is limiting. Undoubtedly, the colonial enterprise, its 
structures and its effects continue to impact the present day. Post-colonialism is the field 
of study that engages with the legacy and enduring effects of colonialism following the 
dismantling of the colonial empires, when previously dominated countries and peoples 
gained their independence.38 In this way, post-colonialism is not confined to a specific 
temporal period in history, but rather transcends the colonial era and encompasses the 
period leading up to colonization, colonization itself, and the period following 
decolonization, which brings us to the present.  
Debate among post-colonial theorists about the space and time that post-
colonialism occupies are plentiful. Stephen Selmon provides a useful proposal to 
understand the scope of post-colonial residue and influence, which this thesis has adopted 
as its definition of ‘post-colonial’ 
 
Definitions of the ‘post-colonial’ of course vary widely…the concept 
proves most useful not when it is used synonymously with a post-
independence historical period in once-colonized nations, but rather 
when it locates a specifically anti- or post-colonial discursive purchase in 
culture, one which begins in the moment that colonial power inscribes 
itself onto the body and space of its Others and which continues as an 
often occulted tradition into the modern theatre of neo-colonialist 
international relations.39 
 
 
37 PETER CHILDS & R.J. PATRICK WILLIAMS, AN INTRODUCTION TO POST-COLONIAL THEORY 1, 
http://www19.homepage.villanova.edu/silvia.nagyzekmi/teoria/childs%20postcolonial.pdf. 
38 Id. 
39 STEPHEN SELMON, ‘Modernism’s Last Post,’ PAST THE LAST POST: THEORIZING POST-COLONIALISM AND 
POST-MODERNISM 3 (Ian Adam and Helen Tiffin eds., Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991); 
originally cited in Roy, supra note 35 at 3. 
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It is important to note that post-colonial theory does not entail a strict 
methodology or criteria. Rather, post-colonial theory is versatile and malleable in its 
cross-disciplinary nature as it provides the means to critically examine the ongoing 
effects of colonial power, oppression and reproduction across disciplines in the 
humanities and social sciences ranging from literature, anthropology and culture to 
politics, media and law; post-colonial theory could even arguably be used to analyze the 
historical and cultural foundations on which biological and mechanical sciences are built 
as well. Therefore, post-colonial theory provides an introspective foundation and toolkit 
to reveal the intricacies of contemporary world order.  
Because post-colonial theory is not constrictive or specific, it includes an 
expansive range of theories and theorists; this extends to discourse theory and legal 
theory.40 In conjunction, Michael Foucault, the father of discourse theory, and Edward 
Said, the father of Orientalism, provide the theoretical framework that will be employed 
in this thesis to unveil the Orientalist underpinnings of the “modern theatre of neo-
colonialist international relations” as manifested by R2P, a twenty-first century emerging 
legal doctrine. 41  It is through Said’s elaboration on Foucault’s scholarship that his 
theories become particularly useful in the analysis of legal discourse through a post-
colonial lens, making it pertinent to understanding the current context in which 
international legal norms operate. 
 
B. Foucault: Discourse as Power 
 
“[P]ower is tolerable only on the condition that it masks a substantial part of itself. Its 
success is proportional to an ability to hide its own mechanisms.”42 
- Michael Foucault, The History of Sexuality 1: An Introduction  
 
According to Michael Foucault, discourse is “both an instrument and an effect of 
power…[it] transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and 
exposes it, it renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart.”43 Thus, discourse analysis 
is a useful method to understand the ways in which power is produced and how it is 
 
40 Roy, supra note 35, at 315.  
41 supra note 39.  
42 MICHAEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, VOL 1: AN INTRODUCTION 86 (Robert Hurley trans., 
Vintage Books 1990) (1976) [hereinafter Foucault Intro]. 
43 Id, at 101.  
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transmitted both to those upon whom it is exercised and to those who exercise it. Through 
understanding systems of discourse, the mechanisms of power that organize political and 
international relations can be understood with more clarity. As explained by Foucault, 
discourse is the system by which dominant groups establish truths by imposing specific 
elements of knowledge, perspectives and values upon dominated groups.  As a social 
formation, discourse functions to establish realities not only for the objects it appears to 
represent, but also for the subjects who form the community on which it depends. 
The same is true of discourse as a legal formation. Legal discourse establishes the 
realities or the assumptions within and upon which rules control interpersonal and 
international relations, actions and interactions. The creation of these realities has its 
basis in assumptions, perspectives and subject positions that are presented as “just the 
way things are” and consequently “taken for granted” as truth and reality.44, 45 Ultimately, 
obtaining a sound and thorough understanding of a discourse reveals the underpinnings of 
its power on society, and understanding the hidden mechanisms within a discourse 
reveals how it succeeds to make systems of power seem acceptable and desired.46  
 
C.  Said: Orientalism as Colonial Discourse 
 
Elaborating on Foucault’s definition of discourse, Edward Said coined the term 
“Orientalism” as a field of study and method of understanding colonial discourse, a 
system within which colonial practices and power came into being and have remained 
active and influential until the post-colonial present. In Orientalism, Said provides a 
productive set of conclusions and a framework through which to understand how colonial 
and post-colonial discourses operate as instruments of power. From this point onward, 
this thesis will employ the term ‘Orientalist discourse’ and ‘colonial discourse’ 
 
44 John Langan, SJ, Ethics and the International Politics of Rescue: Getting Beyond an American Solution 
for An International Problem, RIGHTEOUS VIOLENCE: THE ETHICS AND POLITICS OF MILITARY 
INTERVENTION 4 (Tony Coady & Michael O’Keefe Eds., Melbourne University Press 2005). 
45 Noam Chomsky, Liberating the Mind from Orthodoxies: Interview with David Barsamian, available at 
http://faculty.mu.edu.sa/public/uploads/1333600745.2666Noam%20Chomsky%20-
%20Liberating%20the%20Mind%20from%20Orthodoxies.pdf [hereinafter Chomsky Orthodoxies]. 
46 It is useful to note that our ability to understand discourse is complicated and restricted by the fact that 
we cannot necessarily escape discourse; we are constituted by it even when we are trying to understand it. 
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interchangeably to encompass a variety of important implications that are specific to 
Orientalism as explained below.47  
 Orientalism is a discourse or a “style of thought based upon an ontological and 
epistemological distinction made between ‘the Orient’ [, the East,] and…‘the Occident’,” 
the West.48 This distinction can be expanded beyond an exclusive east-west, north-south 
divide; the distinction between the Orient and the Occident can also be used to compare 
binary oppositions such as just and unjust, legal and illegal, civilized and uncivilized, 
responsible and irresponsible. In essence, Orientalist discourse is centered upon binary 
oppositions that define the Occident as the “contrasting image, idea, personality, [and] 
experience” of the Orient, and vice versa. 49   Such stark distinctions between the 
characterization of the Occidental self and the Oriental Other are reminiscent of the 
archetypal intellectual and political hegemonic discourses of the colonial era.  Likewise, 
Said describes the “relationship between [the] Occident and Orient [as] a relationship of 
power, of domination, of varying degrees of a complex hegemony.” 50   He seeks to 
investigate the “sorts of intellectual, aesthetic, scholarly, and cultural energies” that 
contribute to the development of the Orientalist discourses and asks, “[h]ow does 
Orientalism transmit or reproduce itself from one epoch to another?”51  
Through Said’s theory, this thesis asserts that R2P is itself a reproduction of 
Orientalism in the twenty-first century, that R2P is an Orientalist discourse and that the 
rhetoric of this discourse makes possible the transmission, reinforcement and 
reproduction of colonial power between international law’s Western/Occidental ‘Self’ 
and non-Western/Oriental ‘Other’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
47 It is also worthwhile to note that colonial discourse has broader implications such as the colonialism of 
the Americas for example. For the purposes of this thesis, the focus is on how colonial discourse 
corresponds with or manifests as Orientalist discourse. 
48 Orientalism, supra note 32, at 2.  
49 Orientalism, supra note 32, at 2. 
50 Orientalism, supra note 32, at 5.  
51 Orientalism, supra note 32, at 15. 
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D. Theoretical Intersections: Post-Colonialism, Orientalism, Law & Rhetoric 
 
“[A] post-colonial analysis of law provokes a different reading of it, and this in 
turn instigates a more contextual and expanded understanding of the concept of law. This 
is important, as the law has in many ways essentially remained a ‘Eurocentric 
enterprise’.”52 
-Alpana Roy, Post Colonial Theory and Law: A Critical Introduction 
 
 
As mentioned above, post-colonial theory is cross-disciplinary, lending itself to 
the establishment of intersections between various fields and modes of analysis. Roy 
explains that although “conversations between law and post-colonialism have been 
infrequent,” postcolonial theory “is increasingly being recognized by legal scholars as a 
methodological tool with which to scrutinize the nature of legal discourse.”53 As such, 
Orientalism, a post-colonial discourse theory, is a microscope through which to conduct 
“a different reading” of law in an effort to effectively reveal the “nature” and effects of its 
discourse.54 
The colonial system was built upon stark distinctions between “the colonizers and 
the colonized, [while] post-colonialism refers to a more discursive condition, where the 
culture of the former imperial power has left an undeniable scar of the psyche of the 
colonized.”55 Orientalist discourse analysis can reveal the assumptions that allow for the 
survival and advancement of colonial relationships of power and domination through 
Orientalist representations of history, language, art, society, values and law. Orientalist 
discourses can therefore be understood as a series of narratives and descriptions about the 
Orient and the Occident and about their mutual relationship and duties toward one 
another.  It is predominantly the Occident that creates and disseminates the assumptions, 
narratives and constructions of Oriental discourse.56 Nonetheless, a consequence of its 
power is that it eventually forms elements of the discourse within which the Orient can 
also come to see and describe itself. For subjects of both the Orient and the Occident 
 
52 Roy, supra note 35, at 316; ‘Eurocentric enterprise’ is in quotations in the text because Roy cites Kenneth 
B. Nunn from ‘Law as a Eurocentric Enterprise’ (1997) 15 Law and Inequality 323. 
53 Id, at 315. 
54 Id, at 315. 
55 Id, at 318. 
56 It is worthy to note that the Orient also creates assumptions about the Occident. However, it is the 
Occident that holds the power that allows for its narratives about the Orient to form the primary hegemonic 
discourse. 
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alike (particularly those who are politically disinterested), this irony creates a dilemma 
whereby individuals who do not necessarily seek to promote the narratives of Orientalist 
discourse or its binary subject formations perpetuate it unknowingly because of the 
linguistic constraints imposed on them by the hegemonic Orientalist discourse, which 
will be discussed at length throughout this thesis. 
 Post-colonial theorists have “endeavored to show that the ideological effects of 
colonial laws continue to have contemporary relevance as they continue to be used as an 
instrument of control in this postcolonial world.”57 At the heart of colonial discourse was 
a deliberate system of disguising the imperial, political, economic and social benefits of 
control; the same is true in post-colonial, Orientalist discourse. Ultimately, Orientalist 
discourse portrays Occidental altruism as the motivation behind humanitarian 
interventions; salvation of the Orient from its inferior, primitive, depraved status is 
portrayed as the duty and responsibility of the inherently superior, civilized and 
privileged Occident.  
Each discourse comes with its own set of terms, attitudes, and implications, none 
of which is used or chosen arbitrarily. Rhetoric is what makes Orientalist discourses and 
Orientalist legal discourse persuasive: law is discourse;58 discourse is rhetoric; therefore, 
law is rhetoric. Moreover, Gerald B. Wetlaufer claims that law is “the very profession of 
rhetoric.”59 A discipline that relies so heavily on the minute intricacies of semantics and 
syntax, a discipline in which the very order of a given group of words could lead to 
opposite outcomes that are both legally plausible, a discipline that prides itself and finds 
its identity in a specific, exclusive discourse, “law can never escape the intricacies and 
imprecisions, as well as the promise and power, of language itself.”60 As a ‘profession of 
rhetoric,’ a profession that hinges on the tactful compilation and selection of words, law 
 
57 Roy, supra note 35, at 319., 
58  See Jürgen Habermas, Law as Discourse: Bridging the Gap between Democracy and Rights; Between 
Facts and Norms: Contributions to Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, 108 HARVARD LAW 
ASSOCIATION 1163, 1163-1189 (1995). 
59 GERALD B. WETFLAUFER, RHETORIC AND ITS DENIAL IN LEGAL DISCOURSE, 
http://www.law.uiowa.edu/documents/wetlaufer/rhetoric.pdf. 
60 THE RHETORIC OF LAW 1-2 (University of Michigan Press, Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds ., 
994) [hereinafter Rhetoric of Law]. 
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is “a stage for…linguistic virtuosity, and persuasive argument,” a stage on which rhetoric 
is literally a matter of life or death.61   
E. Post-Colonialism, Orientalism and Law: A Literature Review 
 
The claim that the history of colonialism has shaped the development of 
international law is not novel.62 The legacy of colonialism and its history of occupation 
and exploitation of land, resources and peoples undeniably have lasting psychological, 
political and legal consequences to the present day.  However, much legal scholarship 
fails to explicitly acknowledge the ways that this history can provide insight into the 
power structures that have contributed to contemporary international legal development. 
As explained, post-colonial theory is not restricted to any specific discipline. The cross-
disciplinary quality of post-colonial legal analysis is demonstrated by the scholarship of 
international legal historian and theorist Nathaniel Berman who has extensively explored 
non-legal colonial discourses, such as literature, art and media, to shed light on the 
parallel development of international law and the ways in which the colonial legacy is 
etched into the foundations of the international legal system. His focus on ambivalence as 
a technology of power and the appeals of the Orient are of particular relevance to this 
thesis, which undertakes a similar modus operandi to analyze the mechanisms of power 
exhibited by R2P as a post-colonial, Orientalist legal discourse.  
 
E.1 Ambivalence As a Technology of Power63 
 
“[T]ry as it might, international law seems unable, even decades after decolonization, to 
shed [its] past – a past that continues to haunt it, often in the shape of the puzzling 
persistence of reminders of the colonial legacy in even the most idealistic exercises of 
contemporary internationalism.”64 
-Nathaniel Berman, Passion and Ambivalence: Colonialism, Nationalism, and 
International Law 
 
61 Supra, note 59.  
62 See Anne Orford, A Jurisprudence of the Limit, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS OTHERS 3 (Anne Orford 
ed., Cambridge University Press 2006) [hereinafter Orford Jurisprudence]. 
 See ROBERT JACKSON, SOVEREIGNTY 72 (Polity Press 2007). 
63 NATHANIEL BERMAN, IMPERIAL AMBIVALENCES: SCENES FROM A CRITICAL HISTORY OF 
INTERNATIONALSM, at 411 [hereinafter Berman Imperial Ambivalences]. 
64 Id, at 412-413. 
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One recurring theme in post-colonial studies is ambivalence. The concept of 
‘ambivalence’ in international legal discourse is most closely associated with Berman, 
who focuses on the destabilizing philosophical and practical impact of ambivalence about 
the foundations of international law. Meanwhile, postcolonial theory centered on the 
theme of ambivalence is usually credited to Homi Bhabha. The main divergence between 
their engagements with the concept is that Berman is principally concerned with the 
ambivalence to European colonialists and the evolution of international legal thought, 
while Bhabha focuses largely on the ambivalence of colonized people themselves in 
navigating their own postcolonial identities.65 As it can be difficult to rationalize and 
identify ambivalences, some individuals dismiss or bypass them rather than confront the 
anxieties they provoke, particularly in the context of contemporary liberal 
internationalism. 66  However, disregarding ambivalence precludes the space for 
comprehensive “reflective understanding and genuine disclosure.”67 This thesis attempts 
in part to confront and recognize the psychological and political effects of post-colonial 
ambivalence to the foundation, history, and power of contemporary international law.  
Berman relies on the notion of ambivalence to illustrate how international legal 
thought and development is wrought with paradoxes that emanate from a colonial history 
that can neither be denied nor purged. Through acknowledging the infusion of imperial 
and colonial history into the development of contemporary international law, one can 
appreciate how the colonial legacy continues to create and recreate mechanisms of power 
and control, particularly over international law’s non-Western ‘Others’.68 The absence of 
this introspection is what Berman calls ‘imperial ambivalence,’ which is essentially “the 
inability of an individual, a group, or a culture to rid themselves of ideas, passions, or 
relationships that they nevertheless also claim to condemn or deny.”69 Berman’s primary 
concern regarding the convergence of colonial history and international law is “the way 
in which ambivalence toward colonialism marks the interpretation of legal concepts and 
the establishment of legal structures – indeed, the way in which ambivalence can itself 
 
65 See Id; Bhabha, supra note 31; Bhabha’s concept of ambivalence will discussed further in the conclusion 
of this thesis. 
66 NATHANIEL BERMAN, THE APPEALS OF THE ORIENT at 200-201 [hereinafter Berman Appeals] and 
Berman Imperial Ambivalences, supra note 63, at 413. 
67 Orientalism, supra note 32, at xxiii. 
68 Berman Imperial Ambivalences, supra note 63, at 413.  
69 Id, at 414. 
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become a kind of technology of power and thus define a whole strand of colonial 
discourse and practice.”70 His analysis reveals that international legal regimes that are 
celebrated as neutral and progressive in fact reinforce and institutionalize colonial 
oppressive power structures and “their own set of assumptions and techniques by means 
of which powerful outside forces deploy power on those less powerful.”71 His exploration 
of ‘imperial ambivalence’ reveals that it is impossible to mark a moment in history where 
international law detached itself from imperial power structures and shifted toward a 
model of egalitarian international legal order.72 
 
E.2 Interdisciplinary Approaches 
 
 Berman suggests that traditional linear approaches to the study of international 
legal history are too superficial and thus tend to neglect  “legal history’s fundamental 
breaks and controversies.” 73  Similarly, critical legal theorist Anne Orford notes that 
international law alone cannot holistically provide the answers to the fundamental 
questions that continue to arise along the trajectory of international law’s lifetime; turning 
to other disciplines can help fill this knowledge gap. 74  By focusing too heavily on 
international law’s “successes and failures,” for its “causes and effects” and for “better 
solutions,” historical legal inquiry runs the risk of overlooking the significant cultural 
developments that provide “insight into the deeper meaning of legal change.”75 As an 
alternative, Berman asserts that interdisciplinary engagement with pivotal developments 
in cultural, literary, artistic, and intellectual thought and expression can provide “useful 
insight on current legal and cultural debates…which ha[ve]…shaped our…intellectual 
condition” and the state of international affairs today.76 As he says, “understanding the 
relationship of colonialism to international legal history often requires that we move 
 
70 Berman Imperial Ambivalences, supra note 63, at 416.  
71 Berman Imperial Ambivalences, supra note 63, at 418;  
   See also Frédéric Mégret, From ‘Savages’ to ‘Unlawful Combatants’: a Postcolonial Look at 
International Humanitarian Law’s ‘Other’, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS OTHERS 267 (Anne Orford 
ed., Cambridge University Press 2006) [hereinafter Mégret]. 
72 Orford Jurisprudence, supra note 62, at 7.  
73 NATHANIEL BERMAN, MODERNISM, NATIONALISM AND THE RHETORIC OF 
RECONSTRUCTION, at 353 [hereinafter Berman Modernism]. 
74 Orford Jurisprudence, supra note 62, at 7. 
75 Berman Modernism, supra note 73, at 353. 
76 Id, at 352. 
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beyond law’s disciplinary boundaries.”77 For this reason, a substantial part of this thesis 
is devoted to analyzing law as a system of rhetoric from a linguistic and literary point of 
view. 
 In Modernism, Nationalism, and the Rhetoric of Reconstruction, Berman 
juxtaposes elements of Modernist art with significant changes in international legal 
thought. 78  This type of inquiry “suggests that transformations in legal thought can be 
productively viewed as participating in, and, indeed, partly creating deep shifts in 
Western cultural history.”79 One useful feature of Berman’s analysis of Modernist art is 
his explanation of how Modernist painters used “primitive sources of cultural energy,” 
derived from the Orient, to animate new forms of artistic expression.80 This example 
shows a shift in cultural and political thought marked by appropriating Orient that was 
once repudiated by the colonialists to invigorate and exoticize modern art. In this way, 
the Orient becomes the inspiration, the purpose and the subject of the art. Similarly, in 
The Appeal of the Orient, Berman draws on public discourse that emerged from the 1925 
War of the Riff between France and the Moroccan Riffan rebels.81 He examines French 
newspapers and magazines that described “the relationships among a variety of French 
images of the colonized world…notions of international legal order associated with those 
images, and…anticolonial struggles claimed and evoked by Abd el-Krim,” the leader of 
the Riffan rebels.82 The public discourse revealed how the French perceived themselves 
as the legal, moral and physical contrasting image of the colonized world and also how 
the anticolonial struggles of Abd el-Krim were seen as exceptional, unlike the colonial 
notion of passive colonial subjects. Berman’s examples rely on other disciplines to 
 
77 Berman Appeals, supra note 66 at 197.  
78 Berman Modernism, supra note 73, at 353. 
79 Id, at 352. 
80 Id, at 353; It is important to acknowledge that neither Berman nor this thesis regard the sources of 
cultural energy used by Modernist painters as “primitive.” Berman’s use of this term demonstrates a purely 
Modernist point of view. 
81 Berman Appeals, supra note 66, at 196; The Riffan Rebels were a Moroccan rebel group that resisted 
European colonial advancement on a small piece of territory that fell outside of the control of the Moroccan 
central government and the colonial forces, making it especially susceptible to colonial advancement. The 
Riff region was located along the border between regions of Morocco that were under French and Spanish 
colonial control. Up until their defeat in 1926 to the French, the Riffan rebels successfully resisted Spanish 
encroachment on their territory. 
82 Id. 
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demonstrate how changes in art and cultural corresponded to changes in international 
legal thought and development and vice versa.   
Berman also discusses the disciplinary boundaries that limit our understandings of 
international legal history and essentially claims that to comprehend the legal landscape, 
one must turn to cultural and political writers for insight. The lack of legal commentary 
on colonial and interwar historical developments can function to erase key developments 
from international legal history. However, turning to other disciplines can fill these gaps 
in the history. Indeed, the “turn to cultural and political writers…is…not some arbitrary 
interdisciplinary move;” instead, “this boundary between law and non-law was an artifact 
of the discipline’s interwar relationship to colonialism.”83 Berman’s “turn to writings of 
non-lawyers, therefore, is not an engagement in interdisciplinarity for the sake of 
‘enriching’ or ‘renewing’ legal history but, rather, is both required and forbidden by the 
historical materials themselves.”84 As such, this thesis makes reference to post-colonial 
literary and cultural theorists like Edward Said and Homi K. Bhabha, to contemporary 
political critics like Noam Chomsky, to politicians like Anne-Marie Slaughter, and to 
colonial poets like Rudyard Kipling, who have each shaped theoretical, political and 
conceptual developments that offer significant insight to this analysis of R2P.85 
Similarly, James Boyd White suggests that law should be imagined as a 
“rhetorical and literary process,” one that is fluid and changes constantly to suit the needs 
of its author or user and to appeal to the preferences of its audience.86 In this way, he 
explains that law exists and operates in “interaction with…other systems of discourse that 
make up our world.”87 So, law acts as a thread that weaves in between and connects all 
other systems that govern our world and human interaction including “scientific and 
technical talk, psychological and sociological language, the speech habits of the parties 
and the witnesses,” and, I would add, our opinions and memories of history and politics.88 
He also asserts that law is a rhetorical and literary process, an art of persuasion. In this 
 
83 Berman Appeals, supra note 66, at 201. 
84 Berman Appeals, supra note 66, at 204. 
85 See Chapter III, Section A of this thesis for discussion of Anne-Marie Slaughter’s political theory, 
proposing a ‘New World Order,’ which is one of the most influential arguments in favor of new 
sovereignty. 
86 Rhetoric of Law, supra note 60. 
87 supra note 86, at 38.   
88 supra note 86, at 38.   
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way, one of the most important goals of law is to present itself as appealing, tangible, and 
useful; law must always give itself an ethos of reason, purpose and dedication to justice.  
In addition, a good lawyer or practitioner of legal rhetoric is one who can link legal 
objectives to those of civil society and present itself as benevolent and just. Historical 
narratives, which conjure emotions, nostalgias and repentances, provide an extremely 
useful set of persuasive tools to the legal rhetorician to achieve this ethos.89 In the same 
way, the narrative of R2P tries to establish this ethos through its heavy reliance on 
positive recollections of humanitarian intervention in Kosovo and clear repentances about 
the failure of intervention in Rwanda. Meanwhile, a legal rhetorician can craft historical 
narratives in a way that strategically excludes details that would undermine this ethos.  
 
E.3 The Appeals of the Other 
 
The Appeal of the Orient is another compelling piece by Berman that provides 
relevant insight into the role of the Orient in cultural, historical and international legal 
discourse. In this piece, Berman reveals the ways in which Occidental sexualization of 
the Orient informed historical and thereby legal attitudes toward the Orient. He uses “the 
language of desire and language of law as two interpretive frames to understand” colonial 
discourse.90 It is the sexualized, desire-driven characterizations of the Orient that reveal 
the cultural and historical developments that implicitly impacted the historical 
international legal developments that last until the present day. His focus links the 
discourse and illustration of libinal (sexual or erotic) desires and corresponding 
characterizations of the Orient as indicative of “legal, cultural, and political positions.”91  
In an inventory of passages by French writers in the inter-war period, Berman 
notes various examples of ambivalence in engaging with the Other.92 He explains that 
 
The ‘appeals’ of the Orient [that] the French intelligentsia experienced in 
1925 combined [the] senses of attraction to an Other and challenged by 
an Other. On the one hand, these writers expressed a European desire for 
an alternative to the culture that had brought about World War I, a desire 
that led to the active projection of such an alternative in the exotic 
 
89 As Rwanda and Srebrenica serve to evoke emotions in support of R2P. 
90 Berman Appeals, supra note 66, at 197. 
91 Id. 
92 Berman Appeals, supra note 66, at 196. 
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Orient. On the other hand, they expressed an anxious reaction to 
challenges to European rule coming from the colonized world, challenges 
posed by growing political and cultural contestation from [the Occident]. 
The range of interwar variations on the European fantasy of the life-
giving, yet threatening, Orient emerged out of this combination of 
appeals.93 
 
 
His study draws a number of poignant conclusions, primarily “that the grand dichotomies 
that have long structured discussions of the relationship of Europe to the colonized and 
formerly colonized world such as those between good and bad colonialism, good and bad 
nationalism, real and illusory Orients are both persistent and indeterminate.”94 He also 
asserts that “fears and fantasies about others, marked by shifting and ambivalent 
configurations of gender and sexuality, are an irreducible element of human 
experience.”95 Ultimately, he shows that even anticolonial, anti-orientalist, progressive 
Western discourse relies on Orientalizing the Orient through the appeals of: sexualized, 
seductive desire, marked by a reliance on grand dichotomies; “the desire to conscript” by 
which Occidental discourse seeks to “press the energy of the Orient, imagined as 
exorbitant but irrational, into the service of a European project of revolution, imagined as 
rational but fatigued”; the desire to explore, which relies on the revolutionary 
eccentricities of the Orient; and the desire to disorient, as practiced by the Oriental Other. 
Ultimately he rejects “ahistorical and rationalist critiques of Orientalism” and asserts “we 
can and should look for variety, instability, and ambivalence – uncovering the complex 
impulses that make change possible.”96  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93 Berman Appeals, supra note 66, at 200-201. 
94 Berman Appeals, supra note 66, at 229-230. 
95 Berman Appeals, supra note 66, at 229. 
96 Berman Appeals, supra note 66, at 230. 
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II. R2P: Language and Rhetoric 
 
 
A.  R2P Background 
 
Criticized for contradicting the principle of non-intervention codified under 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, humanitarian intervention has been heavily contested in 
legal and political debates throughout the past few decades.97 ‘Humanitarian intervention’ 
has become the political and legal term used to denote the use of military force by a state 
or group of states in the sovereign territory of another state with the alleged goal of 
ending human rights violations. Following humanitarian intervention in Kosovo, which 
was contentious as it was performed without Security Council authorization, and the 
failure of the international community to respond effectively to gross human rights 
violations in Rwanda, the credibility of the doctrine including the ability to justify it as 
being adequately ‘humanitarian,’ suffered greatly.  Its proponents promoted humanitarian 
intervention as the international solution to mass atrocities and the way to restore peace 
and security in conflict zones. However, this notion was undermined by a track record 
where interventions coincided with the political and economic interests of powerful 
states. R2P emerged from efforts to establish a legal and moral basis for humanitarian 
military intervention and to shift and correct negative perceptions associated with this 
contentious historical track record. The R2P doctrine was designed to provide “new and 
constructive ways to tackle the long-standing policy dilemmas associated with 
intervention for human protection purposes” and essentially posits that sovereignty is a 
conditional right based on responsibility; according to R2P, if a given state is found to be 
“unable or unwilling to fulfill its responsibilities,” the international community absorbs 
 
97 Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, entered into 
force Oct. 24, 1945; Article 2(4) of the Charter reads, “All Members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”  
Also, US National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft said the following at a high level UN panel in 2004; 
“Article 51 needs neither extension nor restriction of its long-understood scope...In a world full of 
perceived potential threats, the risk to the global order and the norm of nonintervention on which it 
continues to be based is simply too great for the legality of unilateral preventive action, as distinct from 
collectively endorsed action, to be accepted. Allowing one to so act is to allow all.” Citation: Noam 
Chomsky, A Just War? Hardly, available at http://www.chomsky.info/articles/20060509.htm (May 2006) 
[hereinafter Chomsky Just War]. 
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the responsibility to intervene and acts in the place of the state.98,99 While contemporary 
liberal internationalism regards R2P as a breakthrough in the discourse endorsing 
humanitarian military intervention, this thesis argues that the doctrine too closely 
resembles that of the colonial civilizing mission and is exercised based on state interests, 
rather than for human security purposes, as claimed in the ICISS report.  
 
A.1 R2P Documents Considered 
 
The terms and conditions of the R2P doctrine are comprehensively documented in 
the 2001 report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(ICISS).100 After the ICISS report was published, the R2P doctrine was discussed at 
length at the 2004 High-Level UN Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, and 
preliminary endorsement of the doctrine was articulated in paragraphs 29 and 30 of the 
outcome report, A more secure world: Our shared responsibility.101 One year later, UN 
member states officially endorsed R2P at the UN World Summit in paragraphs 138 and 
139 of the General Assembly resolution A/RES/60/1.102  Since then, the majority of 
member states have accepted the doctrine, regarding it as a progressive step forward 
toward safeguarding human rights. A few months after it was endorsed by the General 
Assembly, an important reference to R2P was made in the Secretary General’s report, In 
Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All. 103 
Reference to these documents will be made throughout the following chapters of this 
thesis. 
 
 
98 ICISS, supra note 10, at ix. 
99 Alex J. Bellamy, Whither the Responsibility to Protect? Humanitarian Intervention and the 2005 World 
Summit, Ethics & International Affairs 20 (2006) at 143, available at 
http://www.cerium.ca/IMG/pdf/BELLAMY-_ALEX-Whither_the_Responsibility_to_Protect-2.pdf. 
100 ICISS, supra note 10. 
101 UNITED NATIONS, A MORE SECURE WORLD: OUR SHARED RESPONSIBILITY – REPORT 
OF THE HIGH-LEVEL PANEL ON THREATS, CHALLENGES AND CHANGE 17 (2004), 
http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/historical/hlp_more_secure_world.pdf (Paragraphs 29 and 30) 
[hereinafter UN A More Secure World]. 
102 UNITED NATIONS, UN WORLD SUMMIT GENERAL ASSEMBLY OUTCOME DOCUMENT 30 
(2005), http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ods/A-RES-60-1-E.pdf (Paragraphs 138 and 139) [hereinafter UN 
GA Outcome Document]. 
103 UN SECRETARY GENERAL, IN LARGER FREEDOM: TOWARDS DEVELOPMENT, SECURITY 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS FOR ALL, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/59/2005 
[hereinafter UN SG In Larger Freedom]. 
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A.2 From ‘Humanitarian Intervention’ to ‘The Responsibility to Protect’ 
 
The ICISS report explains that the pivotal cases of “Rwanda, Kosovo, Bosnia and 
Somalia” “occurred at a time when there were heightened expectations for effective 
collective action following the end of the Cold War.”104 The report elaborates that these 
examples “have had a profound effect on how the problem of intervention is viewed, 
analyzed and characterized.”105 More than a decade has passed since the R2P doctrine 
was born, and it has been invoked in the pretexts to several interventions including those 
in Afghanistan in 2001, Iraq in 2003, Libya in 2012 and most recently in Syria in 2014; 
each example uniquely complicates how intervention is “viewed, 
analyzed…characterized,” justified and practiced.106  
It is important to acknowledge that the ICISS report and the UN documents where 
R2P is endorsed form the basis of the R2P discourse, though reference to R2P can be 
found in an array of other arenas including for example media, political speeches and 
government policy documents. This thesis has deliberately limited its references to the 
documents listed above because the ICISS report most comprehensively articulates the 
most contemporary version of humanitarian intervention and the subsequent UN reports 
are among the most official of its endorsements. The analysis of R2P conducted in the 
following chapters of this thesis will help to reveal the mechanisms of power produced by 
the rhetoric, discourse and logic of the doctrine, and how its vocabulary has been adopted 
by a wide spectrum of people, including the beneficiaries and perpetrators of R2P, who 
engage with it actively or passively. 
As discussed, R2P is often criticized for being too similar to its predecessor, 
humanitarian intervention. To differentiate itself from the contentious doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention, R2P is based on three “integral and essential components”107: 
the responsibility to prevent,108 the responsibility to react,109 and the responsibility to 
rebuild.110 Though the ICISS report attempts to explain the scope and limits of each 
 
104 ICISS, supra note 10, at  IX. 
105 ICISS, supra note 10, at  IX. 
106 ICISS, supra note 10, at  IX; also refer back to overview in Introduction of this thesis. 
107 ICISS, supra note 10, at  17. 
108 ICISS, supra note 10, at  19. 
109 ICISS, supra note 10, at  29. 
110 ICISS, supra note 10, at  39. 
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component at length, a disproportional amount of the report is dedicated to defensively 
explaining how and why R2P is unlike humanitarian intervention and to defining the 
criteria and parameters of military action, the core of the responsibility to react. While the 
responsibilities to prevent and rebuild are presented as central to the R2P doctrine, they 
actually function as accessories to distract from the military intervention element of the 
responsibility to react. 111   For these reasons, this thesis engages primarily with the 
responsibility to react and regards the doctrines of ‘humanitarian intervention’ and ‘R2P’ 
as two branches from the same tree and will use the terms interchangeably.  
  
B. Shifting the Terms of the Debate112 
 
The first step to conducting a post-colonial analysis of R2P is to deconstruct the 
language of the discourse to understand how it has been instrumental in the creation and 
exercise of power.113 Examining the vocabulary will illuminate the attempt to distance 
the relationship between R2P and humanitarian intervention and why these terms can 
actually be used interchangeably. In particular, the words ‘humanitarian,’ ‘responsibility’ 
and ‘protect’ are used extensively and strategically in the R2P discourse. It is therefore 
important to investigate the connotations that each word carries to understand their wider 
rhetorical and persuasive value.  As explained by Orford, through their strategic 
vocabularies, “the stories that explain and justify the new interventionism,” like the 
‘responsibility’ to ‘protect’ have permeated “everyday language through media reports 
and political sound bites,” making interventionist discourse tangible and practical not 
only for legal technocrats who are engaged in the study or practice of international law 
 
111 Since the birth of doctrine, R2P has primarily been invoked in government speeches and statements to 
legitimize military intervention. R2P is rarely alluded to in policy discussions about international risks or 
post-conflict reconstruction. Discussions about the responsibility to prevent have largely been intended to 
justify military interventions, as seen in the pretext to intervention in Libya in 2012.  
See Nicole Deller, Challenges and Controversies in THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 64 (Jared 
Genser et al. Eds, Oxford University Press, 2011) [hereinafter Deller]. 
112 This title is adopted verbatim from the title of a sub-section in the ICISS report that discusses the need to 
adopt a new vocabulary to discuss R2P because the “traditional language of the sovereignty-intervention 
debate …is unhelpful.” See ICISS, supra note 10, at 16. 
113 Said conducts a similar rhetorical analysis in Orientalism through tracing the writings of Homer, Nerval 
and Flaubert, whose depictions of the Oriental ‘Other’ contributed to the West's romantic and exotic 
construction of Orient as a subject of thought and action.  
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but also for civil society, politicians and even artists. 114  As the language of 
‘humanitarianism’ becomes increasingly colloquial, it is also adopted into the 
vocabularies of the people who are on both the receiving and the performing ends of 
intervention. In this way, the vocabulary of humanitarian protection allows for “strategic 
accounts of a world of sovereign states and of authorized uses of high-tech violence [to] 
become more and more part of ‘the stories we are all inside, that we live daily’,” and 
consequently the enterprise of military intervention becomes more widely accepted.115  
According to White, language is not neutral and it cannot be innocent; it is instead 
used in deliberate ways and actively shapes and contributes to legal discourse. White 
explains that particular words are the building blocks used by lawyers to create powerful 
legal narratives and persuasive nuance. In analyzing legal narratives from a rhetorical 
perspective, one is able to view the law “from the inside” in order to identify the basic 
persuasive mechanics of the discourse and the way that language operates as a 
mechanism of power. “The discourse created by the dialectic between law and language,” 
White argues, “in turn serves to constitute a specific vision of ‘community’, a particular 
normative view of the social world.” 116  White defines this process as “constitutive 
rhetoric,” whereby the rhetoric of law creates visions of involved actors and creates a 
place of belonging for its subjects and its objects. It is through constitutive rhetoric and 
“appeals to the need to protect human rights, democracy and humanitarianism [that] 
international lawyers [are able to] paint a picture of a world in which increased 
intervention…is desirable and in the interest of those in the states targeted for 
intervention.”117 The language of R2P constitutes an attractive identity of a peaceful, 
righteous community that is internationally, politically and socially responsible.  
 
C. New and Improved Vocabularies 
 
At its outset, the ICISS report declares that in proposing a new and improved 
version of humanitarian intervention, “[i]t is important that language – and the concepts 
 
114 ANNE ORFORD, READING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE 
USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 77 (Cambridge University Press, 2003) [hereinafter Orford 
Reading Humanitarian Intervention]. 
115 Id. 
116 Rhetoric of Law, supra note 60, at 226. 
117 Orford Reading Humanitarian Intervention, supra note 114.  
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which lie behind particular choices of words - do not become a barrier to dealing with the 
real issues involved.”118 This is an acknowledgment that the “traditional language” of 
humanitarian intervention had become inconvenient and laden with contentious 
connotations that needed to be replaced with an alternative, progressive vocabulary that 
would escape the “barriers” posed by problematic collective memories of failed and 
ineffective interventions.119 The claim that it is important to avoid the use of contentious 
language early on in the ICISS report is intended to acquit the doctrine from criticism of 
its new vocabulary. Acknowledgment of potential criticism of the language functions to 
absolve R2P of accusations that it could use language deviously, which in turn serves to 
characterize the report and R2P itself as honest, transparent and trustworthy. However, 
upon closer inspection, it appears that this claim is merely rhetorical. 
The fact that the report invests so much effort to pardon itself for any reproach for 
rebranding already contentious issues and legal norms in the discourse of humanitarian 
intervention warrants a closer look. While “changing the language of the debate...does 
not…change the substantive issues which have to be addressed,” it does function to veil 
those issues in order to displace them from the center of the debate and it helps to 
distance the problematic history and collective memory that is associated with those 
issues.120 Changing the language simply offers a more attractive and more persuasive 
vocabulary with which to address the substantive issue of humanitarian intervention.  
Indeed, the new vocabulary provided by R2P is merely a “change in perspective, 
reversing the perceptions inherent in the traditional language and adding some additional 
ones.”121  
Furthermore, in its explanation as to why the vocabulary of R2P needed to replace 
that of humanitarian intervention, the ICISS report acknowledges that the “traditional 
language” of the discourse is “unhelpful” and inconvenient. Its concerns with the pre-
existing language are primarily: the apparent lack of attention to the “potential 
beneficiaries of the action,” the failure to consider the “need for either prior preventative 
effort or subsequent follow up assistance,” and lastly that the existing language of 
 
118 ICISS, supra note 10, at 11. 
119 ICISS, supra note 10, at 16. 
120 ICISS, supra note 10, at 12. 
121 ICISS, supra note 10, at 17. 
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intervention “label[ed] and delegitimize[d] dissent as anti-humanitarian.” 122  These 
concerns are shared by most critics of humanitarian intervention; however they are 
criticisms of the doctrine itself, and less so about the language. By associating these 
concerns with the language, the ICISS report gives the illusion of changing and 
correcting these issues by simply changing the language used to address the very same 
substantive issues. 
 
D.  The Many Faces of ‘Humanitarian’ 
 
“Humanitarian intervention is an orthodoxy and it’s taken for granted that if 
we…do it, it’s humanitarian.  The reason is because our leaders say so.  But you can 
check.  For one thing, there’s a history of humanitarian intervention.  You can look at it. 
And when you do, you discover that virtually every use of military force is described as 
humanitarian intervention.”123 
- Noam Chomsky, Liberating the Mind from Orthodoxies 
 
 
The term ‘humanitarian’ takes on different, often conflicting, meanings depending 
on whether it is used in political and legal discourse or whether it is considered 
linguistically. Literally speaking, ‘humanitarian’ is an adjective that signifies a person 
who seeks to promote human welfare. Some synonyms of the term include: humane, 
benevolent, merciful, gentle, philanthropic, altruistic, and charitable.  Since the 1990s, the 
term ‘humanitarian’ has gained currency in international legal, political and human rights 
discourse and has taken on an entire gamut of meanings. In a world fraught with natural 
and economic disasters that lead to widespread hunger, pandemic diseases and poverty, 
the crises themselves and the assistance that is provided to people affected by them are 
qualified as ‘humanitarian’ as they affect human welfare. International organizations and 
agencies of the UN provide ‘humanitarian’ aid to relieve individuals who are affected by 
‘humanitarian’ disasters.  
 
122 ICISS, supra note 10, at 16; As demonstrated in the following chapters of the thesis, the new language 
actually uses the potential beneficiaries to bolster the intervention narrative and to construct the ‘Self’ of 
R2P, the Occident, as the contrasting image of the beneficiaries and the states they are in, the Orient. The 
new language also uses the responsibilities to prevent and reconstruct as rhetorical accessories to the 
responsibility to react in an effort to dilute the contentious issue of intervention and finally, the new 
language labels and delegitimizes dissent as irresponsible. 
123 Chomsky Orthodoxies, supra note 45. 
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Meanwhile, in political and legal discourse, the term ‘humanitarian’ becomes 
misleading and incongruent to its literal definition.124 International ‘humanitarian’ law is 
the law of war, governing and regulating the conduct of armed conflicts, while 
‘humanitarian’ intervention is the use of military force to intervene in the internal affairs 
of a state where human rights are being violated.125 Paired with the word ‘intervention’ or 
sandwiched between the words ‘international’ and ‘law’, ‘humanitarian’ becomes a 
euphemism for military action or for war. In theory, ‘humanitarian’ intervention and 
international ‘humanitarian’ law are ‘humanitarian’ in that they are motivated by the will 
and intent to protect populations whose lives and human rights are at risk. In that sense, 
they are benevolent and charitable. That said, the word ‘humanitarian’ in the context of 
military intervention or war is paradoxical, as military action by definition, cannot be 
gentle, merciful or benevolent. Nevertheless, ‘humanitarian intervention’ has been 
framed as being the philanthropic, altruistic means through which responsible states 
protect human rights violations taking place in other states that have forfeited their 
responsibilities, while international humanitarian law is assumed to be inclusive, 
providing protection for all people implicated in armed conflicts.126  
Since the development of R2P, “the United States and its coalition partners [have 
used and continue to exploit] humanitarian pretexts to pursue otherwise unacceptable 
geopolitical goals and to evade the non-intervention norm and legal prohibitions on the 
use of international force.”127 As a result, legal analysts like Peter R. Baehr have rejected 
the term humanitarian “as a misnomer.”128 Baehr argues that the term humanitarian is 
used in political and legal discourse because it “has the advantage of sounding nice, while 
being sufficiently vague so as to leave governments considerable freedom of action.”129 
 
124 Because the term ‘humanitarian’ in its literal form is used to deal with crises that are often natural and 
out of human control, the term when used in the context of military intervention, political wars, sanctions 
etc. gives the impression that the actions that brought about the humanitarian problems are also natural and 
consequential; i.e. nobody is responsible for them. 
125 The same applies for “intervention for humanitarian protection purposes,” a clause that is used 
frequently in the ICISS report. 
126 See Mégret, supra note 71. 
127 Robert Falk, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ELITE AND CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES, 1-2 
GLOBAL DIALOUGE 7 (2005) at 1, http://www.worlddialogue.org/content.php?id=329. 
128 Peter R. Baehr, Humanitarian Intervention’ A Misnomer, in INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION IN 
THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD: MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND POWER POLITICS 25 (Michael 
C. David & Wolfgang Dietrich eds, 2004).   
129 Id, at 34. 
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While the word still holds substantial value in R2P rhetoric, Deller claims that R2P itself 
“was designed precisely to move beyond the discredited notion of humanitarian 
intervention [as a means in itself to] confron[t] mass atrocities” through “emphasis on 
prevention [,] peaceful measures,” rebuilding and protection.130  
 
E. Deconstructing The ‘Responsibility’ to ‘Protect’ 
   
“[T]he responsibility to protect acknowledges that the primary responsibility…rests 
with the state concerned, and that it is only if the state is unable to unwilling to fulfill this 
responsibility, or is itself the perpetrator, that it becomes the responsibility of the 
international community to act in its place. In many cases, the state will seek to acquit its 
responsibility in full and active partnership with representatives of the international 
community. Thus the ‘responsibility to protect’ is more of a linking concept that bridges 
the divide between intervention and sovereignty.”131 
-ICISS, Shifting the Terms of the Debate 
  
 
Similar to the above analysis of the evolution and function of the word 
‘humanitarian’ in this discourse, it is important to take a closer look at the new 
terminologies that have been adopted to replace and displace the negative connotations 
carried by ‘humanitarian intervention’. Like ‘humanitarian’, the words ‘responsibility’ 
and ‘protect’ are instrumental in garnering support for intervention as well as sympathy 
for the “potential beneficiaries” of intervention.132 Closer analysis of these terms reveals 
that they are reminiscent of the polarizing emancipatory language of the colonizing 
mission.   
The ICISS report declares that the responsibility to protect should be exercised by 
the international community when sovereign states fail to protect their own citizens from 
avoidable catastrophe.133 In its explanation of the term ‘responsibility to protect,’ the 
report acknowledges that the “primary responsibility…rests with the state concerned;” 
however that responsibility is forgone when and if a state is not fulfilling its primary 
human protection duties toward its own citizens.134 Within the parameters of the report, 
failure to fulfill these duties could include being the actual perpetrator of catastrophic 
 
130 Deller, supra note, 111, at 64.  
131 ICISS, supra note 10, at 17. 
132 ICISS, supra note 10, at 16. 
133 ICISS, supra note 10, at 5. 
134 ICISS, supra note 10, at 17. 
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violations of human rights like genocide, ethnic cleansing, rape or starvation, or by being 
“unwilling or unable” to end them. 135  However, the report does not stipulate what 
constitutes will or ability to end such atrocities, leaving excessive room for interpretation. 
The practical result of this ambiguity is that as long as a threat to human rights can be 
characterized as imminent and a state can be framed as unwilling or unable to protect its 
citizens, other states can justify intervention. This is problematic because it leaves the 
necessity to intervene to be determined on a case-by-case basis rather than through an 
internationally agreed upon criteria. Once a state in question can be characterized as 
failing to fulfill its primary responsibility, then responsibility to intervene is automatically 
borne by other states. While this is rhetorically, persuasively and practically effective, it 
is also one of the intrinsic flaws of the R2P framework 
 
E.1 Responsibility 
 
Deconstructing the word ‘responsibility’ reveals that it is by far the most powerful 
word in the R2P discourse. The term is fully loaded, carrying with it significant legal, 
historical and linguistic connotations. When placed in the context of intervention, human 
protection and sovereignty, the word ‘responsibility’ and its multiple associated 
definitions strategically create an ambiguous rhetorical space. An examination of the 
rhetorical genealogy of the term illustrates how the ambiguous space it creates serves as 
an arena for the legal and political exercise of power.  
In international legal discourse, the term ‘responsibility’ refers specifically to 
‘state responsibility’, the laws that govern when and how states should be held 
responsible for breaching their international legal obligations. The laws of state 
responsibility also determine the appropriate legal consequences for internationally 
wrongful acts, including cessation, non-repetition and reparation. 136  Since the 
establishment of the UN, the codification of the Law of State Responsibility has been an 
extremely contentious, lengthy and complicated work in progress, involving five different 
special rapporteurs over the course of 50 years. Finally, in 2001, the International Law 
 
135 ICISS, supra note 10, at 31. 
136 REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION FIFTY-THIRD SESSION 216 (23 April-
1 June and 2 July-10 August 2001), 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/56/10%28SUPP%29 (Articles 30 and 31).  
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Commission (ILC) adopted the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts and the related commentaries in full.137 Since 2001, the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) has cited the draft articles in international court 
proceedings, elevating the articles to the realm of customary international law. For the 
ILC to adopt the draft articles, it was necessary to keep them as general and abstract as 
possible, leaving substantial space for interpretation. However, the one concrete element 
of an internationally wrongful act is that it must be attributable to a state and constitute a 
breach of an international obligation consisting of either an action or an omission. Thus, 
the concept of ‘responsibility’ in international legal discourse refers to state crimes and 
wrongful acts; ‘responsibility’ is an element in a system of control, governing interstate 
relations.  
Meanwhile, historically, the term ‘responsibility’ is reminiscent of colonial 
discourse and the purported ‘responsibility’ of the colonizers to civilize, emancipate and 
educate the Other. Colonial discourse gained much of its persuasive power through 
carefully crafted assumptions that were presented as natural truths to legitimize and 
promote imperial control and conquest. At the core of these assumptions were the notions 
that the cultural, religious and legal values of the Occident were inherently better than 
those of the Orient and that the civilized people of the European, Western Occident were 
naturally and genetically superior to the people of the Eastern, non-European Orient, who 
were ‘barbaric,’ ‘savage,’ ‘dirty,’ ‘primitive,’ and ‘wild’.138  These assumptions about 
natural superiority served to justify domination and colonization as a ‘responsibility’ that 
emerged from the contrasting generous altruism of the Occident. The colonial narrative 
was promoted not only through political discourse, but also, as Berman and Said suggest, 
through art and literature as central to the colonial mission was the spread of colonial 
propaganda. “The White Man’s Burden,” a poem that was published in the late 
nineteenth century by British poet Rudyard Kipling provides poignant insight into 
colonial rhetoric, the binary oppositions it produced and how it constructed and employed 
 
137 DRAFT ARTICLES ON THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR INTERNATIONALLY 
WRONGFUL ACTS, Report of the ILC on the Work of its Fifty-third Session, (2001) 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf.  
138 Orientalism, supra note 32. 
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the notion of colonial ‘responsibility’. 139 In Kipling’s poem, the “White Man’s burden” 
represented the Occidental ‘responsibility’ “to veil the threat of terror,” to “[f]ill the 
mouth of [f]amine,” and to cease the “savage wars of peace.”140 The poem juxtaposes the 
rational, pious, altruism of the Occident against the “savage,” “need[y]” and “sullen” 
barbarism of the Orient. 141  In doing so, it exhorts the “White Man”/Occident to fulfill its 
“burden”/responsibility to “serve,” feed and emancipate the “[h]alf-devil and half-
child”/Orient from its inevitable self demise.142 A product and instrument of this colonial 
notion of ‘responsibility’ was a sense of moral anxiety regarding the possibility of 
decolonization. This anxiety was promoted far and wide to garner continued support for 
the colonial enterprise. Significant efforts to implore the Occident’s ‘responsibility’ 
toward the chaotic, conflict-ridden Orient meant that departure of colonial rule would 
lead to mayhem in the colonized world, a failure to fulfill the Occident’s God-given 
‘responsibility’. 
The homonymy of ‘responsibility’ extends beyond colonial and legal 
connotations. Linguistically, the term ‘responsibility’ is a synonym for duty, obligation or 
liability, while it can also imply a burden, blame, or guilt. Whereas parents have a 
‘responsibility’ to care for their offspring, thieves can be held ‘responsible’ for robbery.  
However, at a subliminal level, ‘responsibility’ conjures the notion of making someone 
responsible over someone else. Invoking ‘responsibility’ also has a psychological 
consequence in that it creates a distinction between responsible and irresponsible, fit and 
unfit, or innocent and guilty. In its application to states through R2P, a state that fulfills 
its responsibility would be characterized as responsible, implying conscientiousness, 
reliability, and morality. Nonetheless, the ICISS report fails to provide an explanation of 
principles on which these ‘responsible’ states gain their responsibility and how it 
becomes incumbent on them to exercise their inherited duty on the territory of other 
states. The report only alludes to definitions of irresponsible states, but fails to do the 
same for ‘responsible’ states. Regardless, once a state is deemed ‘responsible’ for 
 
139 Rudyard Kipling, The White Man’s Burden, 1899 at http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/kipling.asp 
[hereinafter Kipling]. 
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141 Kipling, supra note 139.  
142 Kipling, supra note 139 (also see Chapter IV, Section C of this thesis for more on resemblance between 
Kipling and R2P rhetoric). 
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protecting civilians in another state, on a semantic level it automatically acquires the 
associated characteristics of morality, trust, and reliability as listed above and imposes the 
contrasting characteristics onto the other state. The word ‘responsibility’ derives its 
power from its ability to evoke these multiple definitions simultaneously, rendering their 
connotations interchangeable; the word ‘responsibility’ implicitly suggests all of the 
above without saying any of the above. 
 
E.2. Protect 
 
The word ‘protect’ further illuminates the ideal of responsibility by insinuating 
the acts of safeguarding, defending and sheltering. As such, states that are deemed 
‘responsible’ to ‘protect’ other states, must have the means to provide defense and 
shelter, meaning that such states would need to have the monetary and military resources 
to fulfill such duties. On the basis of resources, this requirement necessarily excludes 
developing nations from the list of ‘responsible’ states, which implicitly suggests that 
developing nations are irresponsible.143 Additionally, in order to invoke ‘protection’, the 
responsible states rely on a vulnerable subject in need of defense. Therefore, the civilians 
of the states where protection is to be carried out serve as fuel to justify intervention by 
responsible states. In other words, to define and characterize themselves, the responsible 
states automatically require defenseless vulnerable victims in need of protection as their 
reference point. The R2P narrative therefore defines the potential beneficiaries of 
intervention in the same way that colonial narrative described colonial subjects as 
defenseless and in need of emancipation.  
The ICISS report also explains that in some cases “states will seek to acquit 
[their] responsibility in full and active partnership with representatives of the 
international community.”144 In this way, R2P is cast as a “linking concept that bridges 
the divide between intervention and sovereignty.”145 As a result, rather than evading the 
principle of state sovereignty, R2P strategically overcomes the barrier sovereignty poses 
 
143 Also, states that are, at some point, deemed to be ‘responsible’, are much less likely to be ever 
beconsidered as ‘irresponsible,’ even in the future. For example, no nations would think about invoking 
R2P in Ferguson, Missouri or in England during the riots. In other words, ‘responsible’ states become 
perpetually immune to ever being characterized as ‘irresponsible’ since it is assumed that they have the 
power, influence and/or financial means to ‘protect’. 
144 ICISS, supra note 10, at 17. 
145 Id. 
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by diluting the concept and framing sovereignty as a collective enterprise, a “full and 
active partnership.”146  This notion of collective security is also suggested in the UN 
reports that endorse R2P. 147  In this way, R2P functions to replace the concept of 
sovereignty as a right with sovereignty as a responsibility, which inevitably functions to 
support intervention narratives. This is effective because the notion of sovereignty as 
responsibility that is proposed by R2P is not rhetorically contentious or controversial. 
Hence, the simple representation and definitions of responsibility (and implicitly 
irresponsibility) as provided by R2P offer a malleable alternative to state sovereignty and 
the principle of non-intervention, and in turn support and justify interventionist 
objectives. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
146 Id. 
147 See UN GA Outcome Document, supra note 102, at 30. 
     See UN SG In Larger Freedom, supra note 103, at 24-25.  
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III. Beyond Rhetoric – Recharacterizing Sovereignty 
 
 
As demonstrated in Chapter II, the vocabulary of R2P is capable of achieving 
significant transformative reconstruction of humanitarian intervention. R2P rhetoric can 
also be credited with the recharacterization of state sovereignty, which is at the heart of 
the doctrine and of neocolonial political rhetoric. Leading up to the establishment of R2P, 
international law and politics were saturated with “calls for clearer rules to guide 
interventions whose aim was the protection of people, not national security.”148 The focus 
on people has been instrumental in the discourse at large and specifically in efforts to 
redefine sovereignty. As discussed in Chapter II, to further ease anxieties about the 
evasion of state sovereignty, “[t]he ICISS placed intervention within a framework of 
prevention, reaction, and rebuilding.”149 In this framework, military means were framed 
as a measure of last resort after exhausting other means for prevention, reaction and 
protection of populations at risk. This is a strategy that is meant to divert attention from 
the possibility for military action. However, it is well known that the “appeal to 
humanitarian reasons as a basis for military interventions has a long and uneven 
history.”150  As such, “there was substantial opposition among governments from the 
global South to criteria that would legitimize humanitarian intervention. The history of 
colonial interventions left them justifiably skeptical about the intentions of Western 
powers.”151 To manage this skepticism, Orford suggests that contemporary legal and 
political strategies like R2P “put historical knowledge to work…to shift the focus on to 
something else which offers…more options” for the exercise of control.152 
Shifting the terms of the discourse became increasingly necessary as resistance to 
reconceptualizing humanitarian intervention was mounting in the period leading up to the 
proposal of R2P. For example, Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika was extremely 
vocal about his objections to the concept in his 1999 address to the General Assembly 
where he asserted,  “sovereignty is our last defense against the rules of an unequal 
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world.”153 In addition, UN voting blocks representing the developing world, the Non-
Aligned Movement and the Group of 77, “repeatedly rejected the right of humanitarian 
intervention in their collective statements” before R2P was adopted by the General 
Assembly.154 As a result, R2P needed to achieve two substantial tasks: firstly, it needed 
to adopt a new language to displace negative connotations of ‘humanitarian intervention’, 
as discussed in Chapter II, and secondly, it needed to make a rhetorical and logical shift 
from sovereignty as control to sovereignty as responsibility to serve as the foundation on 
which to justify intervention.  
 
A. Sovereignty: From Control to Responsibility 
 
The conception of the unitary state is a fiction, but it has been a useful fiction, allowing 
analysts to reduce the complexities of the international system to a relatively simple map 
of political, economic, and military powers interacting with one another both directly and 
through international organizations. But today, it is a fiction that is no longer good 
enough for government work. It still holds for some critical activity such as decisions to 
go to war, to engage in a new round of trade negotiations, or to establish new 
international institutions to tackle specific global problems. But it hides as much as it 
helps.155 
– Anne Marie Slaughter, A New World Order156 
 
 
In any discussion about the definition, parameters and scope of state sovereignty 
in today’s twenty-first century context, it is imperative to consider the suggestions set 
forth by Anne Marie Slaughter in A New World Order.  Slaughter provides one of the 
most robust responses to critics of R2P who are concerned with the doctrine’s potential to 
prevaricate the principle of state sovereignty. While critics tend to perceive Slaughter’s 
conclusions as radical, many influential decision makers, particularly in the US, consider 
her ideas to be progressive, liberal and valuable. A New World Order does not address the 
doctrine of R2P directly, but it does elucidate issues that are pertinent to the debate, uses 
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much of the same strategies to redefine sovereignty, and provides an analysis of 
international relations that seeks to explain the conditions that make modern 
developments in international law and relations (like that of R2P) a necessary and natural 
progression from the staunch “outdated and inadequate” Westphalian concept of state 
sovereignty that has been a foundational international legal principle since the 1940s.157  
In A New World Order, Slaughter describes a seismic shift in international 
relations during the twenty-first century that, if accepted, could effectively “address the 
central problems of global governance” that still plague inter-state relations today.158 She 
argues that the global context which gave rise to international organizations in the 1940s 
is so drastically different compared to today’s twenty-first century reality that the 
international organizations that were born in that context are too outdated to “meet 
contemporary challenges [and] must be reformed or even reinvented [or] new ones must 
be created.”159 In other words, the UN, which came to life in 1945, is no longer a suitable 
or effective option for the governance of all international affairs, and modern doctrines 
like R2P are necessary to maintain international peace and security. 
Slaughter illustrates a vision of a ‘new world order’ composed of disaggregated 
networks of judges, government officials, parliaments, bankers, nongovernmental 
organizations, professional experts and more. 160  She asserts that these networks are 
already a reality and that the role they play in international relations is too significant to 
ignore. Slaughter suggests that it is no longer sufficient to speak solely of interstate 
relations between “unitary state[s]” when trying to understand the “complexities of the 
international system,” and interstate relations should be seen as a collective enterprise, a 
“full and active partnership.” 161 , 162  Like R2P, Slaughter’s solution to address 
contemporary global challenges is a conceptual shift from sovereignty as control to 
sovereignty as collective responsibility.163 Slaughter’s model redefines sovereignty as a 
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prestigious membership that is earned by individuals and institutions in the networked 
world. In this model, sovereignty becomes a member status that in and of itself promotes 
the norms of honesty, integrity and collaboration that are purportedly lacking in 
international relations and international law today. The problem with the membership 
concept is that it is in direct contradiction to the Westphalian system of international 
relations that presents all states as equal, whereas prestigious membership suggests 
exclusion and exclusivity.  
 
B. Displacing History and Sovereignty in UN Documents 
 
Like Slaughter’s ‘New World Order,’ the UN documents that have endorsed and 
promoted R2P have largely contributed to efforts to reconceptualize sovereignty as a 
conditional right and as a collective enterprise. It is important to examine the rhetorical 
and political strategy used in these documents to distance the notion of state sovereignty 
from its Westphalian historical origin and how the narrative “put[s] historical knowledge 
to work…to shift the focus on to” new notions of sovereignty “which offe[r] more 
options” to manage international relations.164 
 
B.1 Dismissing Westphalian Sovereignty 
 
“Whatever perceptions may have prevailed when the Westphalian system first gave rise 
to the notion of State sovereignty, today it clearly carries with it the obligation of a state 
to protect the welfare of its own peoples and meet its obligations to the wider 
international community.”165 
- Paragraph 29, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the 
High-Level UN Panel on Threats 
 
 
The words ‘perceptions’, ‘clearly’ and ‘obligation’ are all problematic and 
insightful in this passage. Firstly, relegating understandings of the elements of 
Westphalian State sovereignty to mere ‘perceptions’ undermines their historical and legal 
significance. The notion of state sovereignty has its basis in the peace of Westphalia, 
 
See also “disaggregated sovereignty” in Slaughter, supra note 155, at 34. 
164 Orford Jurisprudence, supra note 62, at 9. 
165 UN A More Secure World, supra note 101, at 17. 
 40 
dating back to 1648.166 The concept of state sovereignty under the Westphalian system 
declares that part and parcel of statehood is territorial sovereignty and part and parcel of 
territorial sovereignty is that “supreme authority is vested in the state.” 167  Being 
sovereign, states had no prescribed responsibilities; they had full control over all of their 
affairs. As such, sovereignty precludes any role for foreign intervention in internal state 
affairs, regardless of a state’s power or wealth. By reducing the essential defining feature 
of Westphalian sovereignty to basic “perceptions,” the report belittles the right of 
sovereign states to non-intervention and paves the foundation for a reformulation, a 
dilution, of this right. Secondly, the word “clearly” closes the space for rational dispute 
and presents the conclusion that sovereignty “carries with it…obligations” as a fact rather 
than an opinion. Furthermore, the understanding that sovereign states are responsible for 
the protection of their people is widely accepted. However, the idea that states have 
“obligations to the wider humanitarian community” besides non-intervention and non-
aggression is not as well defined in international legal treaties.  
The rhetorical strategy at work in this paragraph is to present opinions and 
assumptions about international legal history as facts. In doing so, any state that disputes 
the claims or the rhetoric presented in the report of the UN High-Level Panel would 
appear to be disputing the importance of human protection and could consequently be 
characterized as unwilling to fulfill its ‘responsibility’ to protect. 168 As such, similar to 
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the ICISS’s critique of humanitarian intervention language for “labeling and 
delegitimizing dissent as anti-humanitarian,” the new concept and language of R2P labels 
and delegitimizes dissent as irresponsible.169 
 
B.2 Establishing Collective Sovereignty 
 
The Charter of the [UN] seeks to protect all States, not because they are intrinsically good 
but because they are necessary to achieve the dignity, justice, worth and safety of their 
citizens. These are the values that should be at the heart of any collective security system 
for the twenty-first century, but too often States have failed to respect and promote them. 
The collective security we seek to build today asserts a shared responsibility on the part 
of all States and international institutions, and those who lead them, to do just that.170 
-Paragraph 30, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the High-
Level UN Panel on Threats 
 
 
Building upon the assumptions discussed in section B.1, paragraph 30 of the 2004 
UN report states that “[w]hat we seek to protect reflects what we value.” 171  This 
statement limits the opportunity for formerly colonized states to express their anxiety 
about the possibility that R2P could set a precedent for twenty-first century imperialist 
undertakings. Paragraph 30 has two primary rhetorical consequences. Firstly, the logic of 
the first clause automatically positions any claim that calls the statement into question in 
direct conflict with support of “dignity, justice, worth and safety” for citizens. This has 
serious consequences in light of colonial history, as it seems rational that formerly 
colonized states would tend to resist the notion of “collective security” due to its 
resemblance to the emancipatory civilizing mission that was central to colonialism. 
However, doing so leads to the second rhetorical consequence, which is that resistance is 
equated to a failure to “respect and promote” these intrinsic humanitarian values.   The 
rhetoric is effective in that it became too risky for states to question because they would 
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appear to not value human protection and this could be used against them as evidence 
that they are unwilling to protect. This would necessarily open the space for other states 
to absorb their responsibility. By 2005, the ability of states to question notions of 
collective security was drastically reduced by the rhetorical precedent set by the political 
policy makers like Slaughter and the logic of the 2004 UN High-Level report. As such, it 
seems that UN member states were compelled in 2005 to unanimously adopt R2P at the 
General Assembly. 
 
C. The Logical Fallacy of ‘Responsibility’ 
  
Discourse is “both an instrument and an effect of power…[it] transmits and produces 
power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, it renders it fragile and makes 
it possible to thwart.”172 
-Michael Foucault, The History of Sexuality: The Will to Knowledge 
 
 
In the same way that R2P establishes a new vocabulary to distance itself from the 
contentious connotations attached to ‘humanitarian intervention’, the ICISS report 
explains that “the language of past debates arguing for or against a ‘right to intervene’ by 
one state on the territory of another state is outdated and unhelpful.”173As such, R2P 
discourse functions to displace legal definitions of state sovereignty and suggests a 
conceptual shift from the contentious right to intervene to the novel responsibility to 
protect.  
According to Aristotle, the father of rhetoric, “rhetoric is the counterpart of 
dialectic.”174 Dialectic is the art of logical reasoning and argument and relates to the 
syllogism, a basic form of reasoning that requires two related premises and a conclusion. 
So, R2P’s persuasive strategy is not merely rhetorical, it is also makes a logical shift that 
functions “to evoke the mechanism of conditionality from the logic of rights.”175 This 
logic is simultaneously the power and weakness of R2P.  
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Westphalian sovereignty creates a conceptual “barrier” that disturbs the 
contemporary notions of disaggregated or collective sovereignty discussed above. 176 
Therefore, through R2P, enormous efforts have been invested into adopting a new 
vocabulary and into displacing historical legal definitions of absolute territorial 
sovereignty. This has been an essential task in promoting R2P because, in light of the 
international community’s newfound responsibility to protect, the traditional sovereign 
right of the state to non-intervention and the universal right of the citizen to protection 
would appear to be in direct conflict with one another.177 On the one hand citizens have 
the right to have their human rights protected, while on the other hand sovereign states 
have the right to be free from external intervention. By attaching conditionality to the 
sovereign right of the state, R2P creates a hierarchy of rights: human rights take 
precedent over states’ sovereign right to non-intervention. This is an extremely subtle 
logical transition that has very overt practical consequences. As long as a state can be 
characterized as unwilling or unable to fulfill its responsibility, its right to non-
intervention is necessarily revoked. Accordingly, successful adoption of an international 
consensus that the supreme authority of the state is conditional makes the task of 
justifying intervention exponentially easier; this is one of the implicit mechanisms of 
power intrinsic to R2P. As Foucault explains, the success of power is “proportional to an 
ability to hide its own mechanisms.”178  What is also hidden by this logical shift is the 
ways in which the language and rhetoric of human rights have become instrumental in the 
supporting the effort to recharacterize and conceptualize legal foundations of sovereignty.  
The logical transition from rights to responsibilities is the crux and power of R2P. 
Meanwhile, this logic creates a conundrum when applied to the international community 
that purportedly inherits the responsibility to protect from states that are unable or 
unwilling to fulfill their duties toward their citizens. While this logic supports the 
justificatory apparatus in favor of R2P, if one accepts that on the basis of logic and 
precedent responsibility is the signifier that makes sovereignty conditional, then the same 
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conclusion must apply in relation to the international community’s responsibility to 
protect. As discussed in Chapter II, Section E.1, responsibility implies duty, obligation or 
liability. Because ‘responsibility to protect’ is used to as rhetorical alternative to 
‘intervention’, then logically and semantically, intervention becomes a duty of the 
international community.179 When a state fails to fulfill its responsibility, its duty, to 
protect its citizens, the rhetorical consequence is that it is characterized as irresponsible 
and the legal consequence is the loss of its territorial sovereignty. Therefore, if the 
international community were unable or unwilling to intervene in a state where violations 
of human rights are taking place, then the same logic would suggest that the international 
community is ‘irresponsible’. Nevertheless, when the international community fails to 
fulfill its responsibility to intervene, it faces neither rhetorical nor legal consequences. 
This is the weakness of the R2P logic: the failure of the doctrine to define the duties of 
responsibility and the consequences that result from failure to act. So, based on logic, 
“the talk of ‘responsibility’ to protect on the part of the international agencies and the 
international community is mere rhetoric.”180 R2P is not a logical fallacy, but it is the 
institutional and political recipe for a postcolonial international double standard. 
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IV. The Oriental Other  
 
“What does need to be questioned…is the mode of representation of otherness.”181 
-Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture 
 
“[T]he first and last mistake is to judge the Other on one’s own terms.”182 
-Kwame Anthony Appiah, Is the Post- in Postmodernism the Post- in Postcolonial? 
 
“Legal texts about intervention create a powerful sense of self for those who identify with 
the hero of that story. Law’s intervention narratives thus operate not only, or even 
principally, in the field of state systems, rationality and facts, but also in the field of 
identification, imagination, subjectivity and emotion.”183 
- Anne Orford, Humanitarian Intervention, Human Rights and the Use of Force in 
International Law 
 
A. International Law’s ‘Self’ and its ‘Other’ 
 
 The second step to conducting a post-colonial analysis of R2P is to use insight 
from post-colonial theory to substantiate and expand the rhetorical analysis conducted in 
above in order to finally draw cogent conclusions about the R2P discourse itself. This 
section will reveal how the discourse of R2P functions as a mechanism of power that is 
exercised over international law’s ‘Oriental Other.’ This power is established by 
constructing the other as the contrasting image of the self and thereby maintains a 
theoretical, political and legal gap between the Occident and the Orient. This analysis 
will also explain the psychological impact that the discourse has on subjects of both the 
Occident and the Orient and how the discourse establishes Occidental authority that can 
have a tangible impact on international relations. 
Many post-colonial and international legal theorists alike have engaged with the 
question of the ‘Other’ and its implications on the exercise, production and distribution of 
power. 184  Like colonialism, international law is predicated on a powerful system of 
othering. International law has a distinct ‘Self’ and a series of abstract ‘Others’ - 
Africans, Asians and Arabs; women, children and refugees; failed states and developing 
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states. 185  While there are treaties and conventions dedicated to dealing with these 
‘Others’, international law as a whole is a system that was designed to navigate and 
manage the problem(s) posed by the ‘Other’(s). 186  As international law evolves to 
respond to contemporary challenges presented by real and perceived threats like 
terrorism, environmental degradation, civil war, and religious extremism, to name a few, 
it invariably rethinks, resituates and redefines the relationships between its ‘Self’ and its 
‘Others’ through the establishment of new doctrines, like R2P. 187  Interrogating this 
process reveals how othering operates as a mechanism of power within the discourse of 
humanitarian intervention and how colonial relationships and subject positions are 
reinforced, reproduced and transmitted over time.188  
As a starting point, it is important to acknowledge that the colonial history from 
which international law and the concept of sovereignty emerged has undeniably made it a 
Eurocentric system. 189  Being Euro- or Western-centric, the Occident becomes the 
reference point, the baseline, from which the system of international law and its ideas and 
ideals of lawful and unlawful are formulated and transmitted. Accordingly, the 
Eurocentric Occidental ‘Self’ of international law becomes a point of comparison from 
which to constitute the Oriental ‘Other’(s); articulating the distinctions and the relations 
between the two is a perpetual and central task of international law.190 A preoccupation of 
postcolonial theory is to expose this process of establishing and promoting difference 
between the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other.’ Meanwhile, liberal positivist international law 
continues to try to distance itself rhetorically and theoretically from its undeniable 
colonial history by regarding colonialism as a matter of the past and replacing overt 
colonial distinctions between the ‘civilized’ and the ‘uncivilized’ with discreet 
distinctions that are just as powerful, but not as noticeable. Said’s Orientalism with 
supporting insight from Antony Anghie’s ‘dynamic of difference’ and Frédéric Mégret’s 
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‘constitutive other’ provide a helpful framework to scrutinize the mechanisms of othering 
produced by R2P.  
Anghie’s ‘dynamic of difference’ refers to “the endless process of creating a gap 
between two cultures, demarking one as ‘universal’ and civilized and the other as 
‘particular’ and uncivilized, and seeking to bridge the gap by developing techniques to 
normalize the aberrant society.”191 This everlasting bridging process sustains the power 
relations between international law’s ‘Self’ and its ‘Other,’ despite the proliferation of 
contemporary international legal doctrines that are apparently inclusive, universal and 
regard all states equally. International Law’s power over the Orient emanates from these 
continual efforts to bridge the gap between the Occident and the Orient through 
developing seemingly ‘new and improved’ doctrines for protecting human rights and for 
managing international relations that in practice serve as ‘new and improved’ ways to 
manage colonial relations. The ICISS report claims that it needed to adopt a new 
language because the “traditional language” of humanitarian intervention “and the 
concepts which lie behind particular choices of words” were actually “barrier[s] to 
dealing with the real issues involved.”192 After analyzing the new language it has become 
apparent that, following the logic of the ‘dynamic of difference,’ the concepts that lie 
behind the new vocabulary actually serve as the bridge to avoid dealing with the real 
issues involved. 
Frederic Mégret in From ‘Savages’ to ‘Unlawful Combatants’ suggests that 
International Humanitarian Law, the laws of war, are intentionally designed to exclude 
the colonial Other. He states, “exclusions from the protection of the laws of war might in 
fact be very much legitimized by some of the founding ambiguities of the laws of war 
themselves.”193 The aim of his work is to delve into the ambiguities to bring to light how 
international humanitarian law “has always had an ‘[O]ther’…that is both a figure 
excluded from the various categories of protection, and an elaborate metaphor of what the 
laws of war do not want to be.”194 Mégret explains that international humanitarian law 
“has a status for everyone” who could possibly be implicated in a war situation, such that 
 
191 Id.  
192 ICISS, supra note 10, at 11. 
193 Mégret, supra note 71, at 266. 
194 Id. 
 48 
everyone enjoys some sort of legal protection.195 However, “every protection under the 
laws of war, every status, might also be gained by denial of an ‘[O]ther,’ so that the law 
is both inclusive and exclusive.”196 Following White’s theory of ‘constitutive rhetoric,’ 
through which legal rhetoric creates and constitutes its subjects and its objects, Mégret’s 
argument is that international humanitarian law creates a ‘constitutive other.’ 197  He 
asserts that the ‘constitutive other’ was “central to the emergence of the laws of war.”198 
The constitutive other was often the raison d'être driving the creation of international 
humanitarian law, as the laws sought to “distance themselves” from the “uncivilized, 
barbarian, savage” other. 199  Focusing on the ‘constitutive other’ allows for genuine 
disclosure about the origins of the continuing reliance of international law on patterns of 
exclusion, beyond the realm of international humanitarian law. 
 
B.  The Orientalist Mechanism 
 
This thesis argues that R2P is itself an Orientalist discourse that functions as a 
mode of reproducing and exercising power over the ‘Other’ of international law through 
the construction and promotion of colonial binaries. Orientalist discourse is based on the 
constitution of clear distinctions between the Occident and the Orient that define the 
Orient as the “contrasting image, idea, personality, [and] experience” of the Occident.200  
R2P’s distinction between the responsible ‘Self’ and the irresponsible, needy ‘Other’ are 
reminiscent of the archetypal intellectual and political hegemonic discourses of the 
colonial era. Said explains, “because of Orientalism [,] the Orient…is not…a free subject 
of thought or action.”201 The Orient, and subsequently the Oriental, is spoken for and 
constituted by Occidental cultural, political, and literary and legal works. Therefore, 
Orientalism renders the ‘Other’ of R2P as “none other than the colonial ‘[O]ther’.”202 
As discussed, the ICISS report has made concerted efforts to establish an 
alternative vocabulary to deviate from the sovereignty-intervention debate that “focuses 
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attention on the claims, rights and prerogatives of the potentially intervening states much 
more so than on the urgent needs of the potential beneficiaries of the action.”203 Indeed, 
the rhetorical impact of introducing the concept of an international ‘responsibility’ to 
‘protect’ is an apparent shift in “emphasis [,] away from the would-be intervening states 
and their rights under international law” and towards “populations at risk of large-scale 
loss of life or ethnic cleansing” and the would-be intervening states’ obligations.204  
However, closer analysis reveals that in practice, through this shift in focus, R2P 
discourse actually appropriates the explicit and implicit appeals of the Orient to 
substantiate the authority of the Occident; the populations at risk and their circumstances 
serve to fuel the interventionist narrative. 205  This supposed shift in focus effectively 
constitutes the ‘potential beneficiaries’ and the circumstances that afflict them, as the 
contrasting image of the ‘potentially intervening states.’ In other words, the R2P narrative 
employs the afflicted Orient to describe everything that the Occident is not. It is this 
supposed shift in focus that reproduces and reinforces colonial binary oppositions 
between the civilized Occident and the barbaric Orient. 
 
C. The Orientalist Process: “The White Man’s Burden” = “The Responsibility to 
Protect” 
 
Orientalist discourse has a tendency to represent its  “subject matter without ever 
changing its mind about the Orient as always being the same, unchanging, uniform, and 
[a] radically peculiar object.” 206   The Orientalist is seduced by the ‘peculiar’ and 
allegedly exotic subject matter that is the Orient and the Oriental and makes it the object 
and subject, the raison d'être, of his/her practice.207 Early orientalist texts represented the 
“peculiar” Orient as a perverse place wrought with conflict and barbarism. Following the 
modus operandi employed by Berman and Said to analyze Orientalist discourse 
(modernist art and colonial literature), I will examine the ICISS report as a contemporary 
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Orientalist discursive specimen to demonstrate how R2P others and appropriates the 
Orient in the same way that colonial orientalists did. To conduct this analysis, I will 
compare and contrast the colonial subject in Kipling’s The White Man’s Burden with the 
‘beneficiaries’ of R2P in the ICISS report. This will demonstrate that the colonial subject 
of Kipling’s nineteenth century poem and the “potential beneficiaries” of the twenty-first 
century’s R2P are indeed the “the same, unchanging [and] uniform.” 208  More 
importantly, this analysis will also provide an example of how “Orientalism [is] 
transmit[ted]…from one epoch to another.”209 
 The White Man’s Burden is about the colonization of the Philippines by the 
United States in the nineteenth century.210 The poem provides a vivid example how the 
‘other’ was orientalized in colonial literature. It is a literary artifact that provides a clear 
example of how colonial Orientalist rhetoric promoted imperialist aspirations as noble, 
justified and necessary. 211  Kipling’s subject, the Filipino ‘Other,’ is immediately 
characterized in the title of the poem as a “burden.”212 This implies that the ‘Other’ is a 
liability or a problem that needs to be solved, managed and saved. This notion of burden 
as liability is analogous to R2P’s loaded notion of ‘responsibility.’213 In the first stanza of 
the poem, Kipling describes the ‘Other’ as the White Man’s “wild” “new-caught” 
“captiv[e],” suggesting that it is a “radically peculiar object”214 that   needs to be tamed; it 
is therefore not a “free subject of thought or action.” 215  Throughout the poem, the 
‘Others’ are characterized as “fluttered folk,” “sullen peoples,” “half-devil and half-
child” and “sloth[s]” who are “silent” “heathen[s].”216 While Kipling overtly orientalizes 
the ‘Other’, R2P does so implicitly. R2P describes the populations it seeks to assist as 
‘beneficiaries,’ implying that they are passive recipients of the international community’s 
benevolent service and thereby incapable of contributing to or having a say in ending the 
atrocities they are afflicted by. This is an example of the Orientalist tendency to regard 
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the Orient as “non-active, non-autonomous [and] non-sovereign with regard to itself.”217 
While the ICISS report claims that R2P refocuses attention on the potential beneficiaries 
of intervention, it merely refers to its beneficiaries in passing, at best as “victims who 
suffer and die.”218 In lieu of explicitly characterizing the other as Kipling does, the ICISS 
report claims to refocus attention onto the ‘potential beneficiaries’ of intervention, the 
other, but instead it actually strategically focuses on the crimes that give rise to the 
international community’s “duty to protect” such as “mass killing…systematic rape 
and…starvation.” 219  This tactic positions the responsible international community in 
opposition to the irresponsible states who are themselves “the actual perpetrator[s] of 
crimes or atrocities” or are “unwilling or unable to fulfill [their] responsibility.”220  
Kipling’s poem urges the colonialists to fulfill their duty to emancipate the Orient 
by warning about the consequences of inaction against “the threat of terror,” “[f]amine,” 
“sickness,” and “savage wars.”221 It urges the White Man to “serve [the] captive’s need” 
and to “work another’s gain.”222 Similarly, the ICISS report describes intervention and 
R2P as “a promise to people in need: a promise cruelly betrayed.”223 It appeals to the 
collective guilt of the international community that has left “conscious-shocking 
situations crying out for action” to “languish in indifference and neglect.” 224  And it 
warns that if the international community “stays disengaged, there is a risk of becoming 
complicit bystanders in massacre, ethnic cleansing, genocide” and “acts of terror or 
rape.” 225 The report describes inaction as a “risk to people everywhere.”226 In essence, 
the Occidental Euro-Western international community described by R2P is rhetorically 
analogous to the Occidental Euro-Western White Man in Kipling’s poem.  Both the 
ICISS report and The White Man’s Burden create binary oppositions that characterize the 
Occident as the civilized and responsible contrast to the uncivilized, dangerous and 
irresponsible Orient. 
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D. The Orientalist Authority 
 
“The community-sanctioning authority to settle issues of international peace and 
security has been transferred from the great powers in concert to the UN. The UN, with 
the Security Council at the heart of the international-law enforcement system, is the only 
organization with universally accepted authority to validate such operations.”227 
-ICISS Report, The Question of Authority 
 
 
Authority is not an innocent rhetorical tool because it “is formed” and  
“disseminated,” and because it is “instrumental” and  “persuasive.” 228 The purpose of 
R2P is to establish authority for the international community to intervene in the internal 
affairs of sovereign states under the umbrella of international law. Said explains that 
authority becomes “indistinguishable from certain ideas it dignifies as true, and from 
[the] traditions, perceptions, and judgments it forms, transmits [and] reproduces.”229 The 
tools that Said uses to study authority in Orientalist works include 
 
Strategic location, which is a way of describing the author’s position in a 
text with regard to the Oriental material he writes about, and strategic 
formation, which is a way of analyzing…the way in which…types of texts, 
even textual genres, acquire mass, density, and referential power among 
themselves and thereafter in the culture at large.230 
 
 
As demonstrated throughout this thesis, R2P discourse strategically and 
rhetorically locates the Occident in opposition to the Orient. The dichotomies between 
the potential interveners and beneficiaries of ‘protection’ establish a ‘dynamic of 
difference’ that apparently bridges the sovereignty-intervention divide, but functionally 
maintains the gap between the Occident and its ‘Other.’231 This gap also provides a buffer 
space from which justified military action emerges and through which Occidental 
authority materializes. R2P’s ironically selfless, humanitarian rhetoric apparently serves 
to normalize the eccentric Orient and to sustain strategic power relations under the guise 
of international justice. Strategically, R2P discourse locates the Orient several steps 
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behind the Occident in terms of political, cultural, economic and legal advancement, 
exonerating and exhorting Occidental authority to intervene to emancipate the Orient. It 
is the Orientalist binary oppositions between responsible and irresponsible, safe and 
dangerous, and civilized and uncivilized that establish the strategic moral high ground 
from which the Occident can deploy its political and legal mechanisms of power.  The 
focus on the ‘constitutive other’ of R2P strategically locates the ‘international 
community’ on the positive end of binary oppositions and characterizes its political 
actions and legal decisions as ethical. 
Like colonialist rhetoric, the R2P narrative gains much of its persuasive value 
through appeals to emotion and compassion that are accomplished by appropriating 
Oriental hardship to exhort Occidental philanthropy. But it also gains much of its 
credibility and appeal through strategic formation. The seemingly basic 
responsible/irresponsible dichotomy produced by the new vocabulary of R2P is 
impressively capable of evoking legal, historical and psychological connotations to 
qualify the Orient without actually mentioning any of them explicitly. This strategic 
formation gives the dichotomy referential power to simultaneously suggest the positive 
image of duty, benevolence and altruism, the negative connotations of guilt and crime, 
and a slew of strategic colonial binaries. Furthermore, the very notions of ‘international 
law’ and ‘international community’ are themselves rhetorically strategic formations that 
implicitly represent the Occident without explicitly saying so. International law as a 
structure of order, control, justice and equity is strategically and rhetorically located in a 
metaphysical space outside and above states and international relations.232 There is thus a 
tendency to turn to international law as an impartial formula for the restoration of 
international peace and security, to restrain the abuse of power and to establish economic, 
diplomatic and political justice and cooperation. The ‘international community’ also 
enjoys this strategic ‘outside and above’ formation of the ‘international’ abstract space. 
Capitalizing on the referential power of the impartial, disinterested, disengaged 
‘international,’ it is taken for granted that the actions of the ‘international community’ are 
just. Moreover, the word ‘community’ itself suggests inclusivity, collaboration, and 
collectivity, all concepts emphatically supported by contemporary liberal 
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internationalism. The strategic formation and location of law and states into the 
metaphysical ‘international’ space gives them immense power. And by placing R2P 
under the umbrella of liberal international law it benefits from the referential power of 
international law as a trustworthy and universal enterprise. 
 
E. The Orientalist Effect: Ambiguity, Ambivalence and Power 
 
There is nothing ‘post’ about the post-colonial present we are experiencing today; 
the effects of the colonial enterprise continue to manage and control the Orient in 
contemporary international relations.233 The ideological and political inequalities of the 
colonial era have been etched into the foundation of the international legal system that 
also gave rise to the notion of state sovereignty. Despite the emergence of contemporary 
egalitarian international legal doctrines, each legal development that stems from this 
foundation invariably recycles its colonial history and reuses its instruments of power and 
control. In the absence of an honest and explicit acknowledgment of its colonial past, all 
efforts to veil or purge the colonial residue from the international legal system will be 
done in vain. R2P is not an exception. The doctrine is effective because it is couched in 
seemingly progressive liberal humanitarian rhetoric, resulting in a powerful state of 
ambivalence that achieves the illusion of the ‘post’-colonial.   
The power of R2P’s humanitarian narrative emanates from its ability to veil its 
colonial resemblance. This is achieved by establishing rhetorical ambiguities that can be 
exploited for the justification and the exercise of power. The logical, legal and linguistic 
conclusions made possible by the words ‘responsibility’ and ‘protect’ establish an 
ambiguous rhetorical space where multiple and seemingly unrelated powerful 
connotations become interchangeable. These connotations are strategically kept in 
suspense, with only their impact made apparent: the evasion of state sovereignty and the 
justification of intervention. The rhetoric that operates in this ambiguous space 
infantilizes the Orient and allocates political and legal power to the Occident. This 
ambiguous space is itself the locus of our ‘imperial ambivalence:’ ambivalence to the 
lasting psychological, social and political influence of colonialism on contemporary 
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international relations and law and to our resounding support for new doctrines that 
(re)institutionalize that legacy and system.234  
Through R2P, the Occident creates assumptions it exalts as truths. It then 
disseminates them far and wide. Due to our ambivalence to the root and purpose of these 
assumptions, they are perceived to be realities. These realities are then imposed on the 
Occident and the Orient alike in the form of international legal discourse. This is how 
progressive liberal international legal doctrines like R2P reinforce and (re)institutionalize 
colonial oppressive power structures today. As Foucault explains, the success of power is 
proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms. 235  Certainly, this ‘imperial 
ambivalence’ is the most effective and ingenious hidden mechanism of power created by 
R2P.  
The twenty-first century imperial ambivalence can also be explained as follows: 
The Orient simultaneously serves the interests of the Occident while it challenges the 
interests of the Occident. The Occident condemns oppression and violence in the Orient, 
but it needs oppression and violence to occur in the Orient to have something to 
condemn. When there is something to condemn, there is something to change. The 
Occident therefore promotes the ideals of equality, liberalism and democracy and seeks 
to share/impose them with/on the Orient. Meanwhile, when the Orient understands 
equality internationally, it challenges the Occident’s political, legal and economic 
supremacy and it resists what the Occident is seeking to impose. This in turn evokes 
anxiety amongst the very same Occident that advocates for equality, liberalism and 
democracy, so it strategically characterizes the Orient as ‘irresponsible’ in order to justify 
intervention. However, intervention itself is oppressive and violent, the very issues that 
the Occident condemned in the first place. Imperial ambivalence today takes the form of 
a mutual desire to liberate, control, protect and oppress the Orient.  
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F. Normalizing Orientalism 
 
“To the extent that the Euro-American self-image was shaped by the experience of 
colonizing the world…the [“]end[“] of colonialism presents the colonizer as much as the 
colonized with a problem of identity.”236 
 - Arif Derlik, The Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the Age of Global 
Capitalism 
 
The effect of the ambivalence created by R2P is not limited to politics and law; it 
also has a psychological impact on its subjects in both the Orient and the Occident. 
Anyone who is not readily aware of the implications international law has on 
contemporary world order are ambivalent to its power, whether they are subjects of the 
Orient or the Occident. The psychological impact therefore is that the strategic, 
Orientalist rhetoric of R2P discourse has been normalized. As the rhetoric of 
humanitarianism becomes increasingly colloquial, it is proliferated and adopted by 
people around the world who oppose human rights abuses. 237  Calling for the 
‘international community’ to ‘do something’ to put an end to heinous violations of human 
rights and to live up to its international ‘duties,’ results in a subconscious reinforcement 
of the range of Orientalist implications discussed in this thesis thus far. Meanwhile, 
critics of intervention who are mindful of its potential for misuse use the same lexicon to 
condemn it. Each time critics of intervention express horror at catastrophic situations 
where human rights are being violated, they are implicitly and subconsciously invoking 
intervention. By engaging in the discourse, whether through support or criticism, 
individuals inadvertently bolster the Orientalist narrative that reinforces assumptions 
about the Orient that it dignifies as true. This preserves the strategic rhetorical, political, 
legal and economic gap between the Orient and the Occident that makes the Orient 
susceptible the geopolitical ambitions of the powerful global West. 
Moreover, one of the most powerful mechanisms of oppression is the ability to 
make its legitimacy internalized. 238  This is another powerful feature of R2P’s 
ambivalence mechanism. The strategic humanitarian rhetoric of R2P is assumed by not 
only the proponents of intervention in the Occident, but also by opponents of imperialism 
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in the Orient who are ambivalent to its implicit colonial and oriental foundation. As such, 
it is becoming more and more common for subjects in the Orient to appeal to the 
‘international community’ for political support. In doing so, subjects of the Orient, 
ambivalent to the scope of implications, unconsciously ‘self-orientalize.’ As a subject of 
the Orient, invoking R2P in the face of wide-scale human rights violations results in 
‘self-orientalization.’ At the same time, when people of the Occident invoke intervention, 
they unconsciously reinforce the Orientalist discourse, thereby empowering Oriental 
subordination and subservience to the Occident.  
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Conclusion  
 
 
The purpose of this thesis has been to engage critically, historically and rationally 
with the R2P discourse to obtain a “reflective understanding and genuine disclosure” 
about the source of my discomfort with regards to the notion of intervention for human 
protection purposes. 239  To do so, this thesis attempted to confront the continuing 
implications of colonial history on contemporary international law and to recognize its 
real psychological and legal effects. Through the lens of Orientalism and post-colonial 
theory, this thesis has exposed the strategic paradoxes, the ambiguities, the incongruities 
and the ambivalences created by the R2P discourse and how together they operate as 
mechanisms of international legal power. I argue that the rhetorical persuasiveness of the 
R2P narrative is itself an Orientalist discourse that recreates and reinforces colonial 
binaries between the Occident and the Orient, making the Orient susceptible and subject 
to contemporary forms of control and domination in the name of humanitarianism. This 
project has been important because genuine disclosure requires one to challenge the 
foundation “from which liberal positivist law unthinkingly functions.” 240  Through its 
engagement with R2P, this thesis has merely scratched surface of this type of historical 
legal inquiry. This thesis will therefore serve as an intellectual launching pad from which 
I intent to delve further into the question of the international legal language and how it 
produces powerful and oppressive ambivalences that are intellectually and legally 
normalized and internalized by the ‘Other.’ I am particularly interested in investigating 
how the ‘Other’ served as an instrument of power in the pretext to intervention in Libya 
and Syria and would like to expand my research to examine the ways in which the 
‘Other’ was appropriated and constructed in the humanitarian narrative leading to these 
specific interventions.  
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